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Despite all the rhetoric from the gun lobby, the fact is that the vast
majority of law enforcement officials and most of the American
public supports [the Brady] bill.'
-Representative Thomas Downey
Despite all the heated rhetoric about handguns, the Brady bill is
not a solution to our crime problem. 2
-Representative Jerry Costello
INTRODUCTION
This Article is about rhetoric. In a democratic, pluralistic society,
action on any issue of social importance depends on acceptance of
the action by many different audiences. Acceptance depends on the
audiences being persuaded as to the rightness of the action. Persua-
sion depends on effective rhetoric.
When Congress debated the Brady bill,3 a bill that imposes a wait-
1. 137 CoNG. REC. H2845 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Downey).
2. Id. at H2845 (statement of Rep. Costello).
3. The "Brady bill" is the popular title given to proposed federal legislation to require
waiting periods and background checks for handgun purchases. Sean Murphy, Mayor Renews
Call For Fewer Handguns, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 199 1, at 46. Congress debated the bill during
its first session in 1991. See 137 CoNG. REC. H2854 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (introducing
Brady bill); 137 CONG. REC. S59,039 (daily ed.June 28, 1991) (debating Brady bill in Senate).
The Brady bill is intended to enforce existing prohibitions on handgun purchases by con-
victed felons, fugitives from justice, drug users, mental defectives or persons who have been
committed to mental institutions, illegal aliens, persons who have been dishonorably dis-
charged from the armed forces, and persons who have renounced their United States citizen-
ship. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d), (g) (1988) (identifying persons not eligible for handgun
purchases). The bill was named in honor ofJim and Sarah Brady. Stephanie Saul, Brady Vows
to Keep Pushing Gun Bill, NEWSDAY, Nov. 28, 1991, at 17. Jim Brady is the former press secre-
tary to President Ronald Reagan who was wounded by John Hinckley during Hinckley's at-
tempt to assassinate the President. Howell Raines, Reagan Wounded in Chest by Gunman, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1981, at Al. His wife, Sarah Brady, is the chairwoman of Handgun Control,
Inc., a Washington-based lobbying organization that promotes gun control legislation. Id.
In the summer of 1991, the United States House of Representatives and the United States
Senate introduced different versions of the Brady bill as part of broader crime control pack-
ages. H.R. 7, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §9 2701-2703
(1991). Both bills required licensed firearm dealers to forward identifying information
regarding a prospective handgun purchaser to the chief law enforcement officer at the
purchaser's place of residence. The dealer would then have to wait for a period of days to
receive information from the officer as to whether the purchase would violate federal, state, or
local law. The House bill provided for a seven-day waiting period, while the Senate bill speci-
fied a waiting period of five business days. H.R. 7 § 2(a)(s)(1)(A)(ii)(I); S. 1241
§ 2701(a)(u)(A)(ii)(I). A more important difference between the two bills is that only the Sen-
ate bill actually required the chief law enforcement officer receiving the information to con-
duct a background check of the prospective purchaser. S. 1241 § 2701(a)(u)(2). The House
bill required only that the seller communicate the information to the police and then wait
seven days. H.R. 7 § 2(a)(s)(1)(A)(III). Though the drafters of the House bill apparently
contemplated that the police would conduct a background check upon receiving the informa-
tion, the bill did not impose such an obligation. In fact, the House bill expressly stated that it
"shall not be interpreted to require any action by a chief law enforcement officer which is not
otherwise required." Id. § 2(a)(s)(2).
The Senate bill also went further than the House bill in mandating that the Attorney Gen-
eral create a computerized "national instant criminal background check system." S. 124 1,
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ing period and background check for handgun purchases, rhetoric
flowed freely on both sides. As reflected in the introductory quotes,
each side chastised the other for using rhetoric. There is nothing
improper or indecorous, however, about using rhetoric in a debate.
Although often characterized pejoratively, "rhetoric" is not a pejo-
rative term. It is simply a label for the discourse of practical argu-
mentation. 4 To accuse an opponent in an argument of engaging in
supra, § 2702. To ensure this would be accomplished, the bill imposed specific timetables on
the federal and state governments for the development of such a system. Id. The bill gave the
Attorney General 30 months to certify that a national computer system had achieved at least
80% currency of case dispositions for all cases in which there had been activity within the five
preceding years. Id. § 2702(d)(1)(A). At that time, the Attorney General would also have to
determine whether the states were in compliance with a five-year timetable to develop systems
of similar capabilities. Id. § 2702(c)(2),(d)(l)(B). A state that was certified to be on schedule
with the timetable would be released from the federal waiting period and background check
requirements. Id § 2702(d)(2). Six years after the law became effective, the Attorney General
would be required to certify whether the states were fully in compliance with the act. I&
§ 2702(d)(3). If they were determined to be in compliance, the waiting period and back-
ground check requirements would be lifted. Id.
Both the House and Senate bills created some exceptions to the waiting periods and back-
ground checks, including situations where a threat had been made against the life of the pur-
chaser or a member of the purchaser's family. H.R. 7 § 2(a)(s)(1)(B); S. 1241
§ 2701(a)(u)(1)(B). Both bills also exempted from coverage purchasers possessing permits
issued by states that require background investigations as a condition for obtaining the per-
mits. H.R. 7 § 2(a)(s)(1)(C); S. 1241 § 2701(a)(u)(1)(C).
In November 1991, House and Senate conferees reached agreement on an overall crime
bill, which was designated the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1991, of which the Brady bill
was a small portion (Title V, Subtitle A). H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see also
CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 3371, OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1991, H.R. REP. No.
405, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. HI 1,686-HI 1,744 (daily ed.
Nov. 26, 1991). See generally Paul Houston, House, Senate Conferees Agree on Big Crime Bill, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 25, 1991, at Al (explaining history of agreement). The conferees adopted the
Senate version of the Brady bill, with only minor modifications. See JOINT EXPLANATORY
STATEMENT OF THE COMMrIEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. REP. No. 405, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. at HI 1,740 (explaining that House conferees assented to
adoption of Senate version of Brady bill with modifications including: (1) waiting period is to
be triggered when firearms transferor rather than transferee notifies chief local law-enforce-
ment officer of contents of transferee-information statement; (2) waiting-period exemption
based on remote location is to be additionally conditioned on existence of local ratio of less
than 2.5 law-enforcement officers per 1000 square miles; and (3) funding grants for improve-
ment of criminal records are to be administered by Bureau of Justice Statistics).
In letters to the Republican leaders of Congress, President Bush threatened to veto the
crime bill because of his objections to provisions relating to habeas corpus reform, the exclu-
sionary rule, and the death penalty. Letter from President George Bush to Rep. Robert H.
Michel (Nov. 25, 1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. Hl1,678-79 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991);
Letter from President George Bush to Sen. Robert Dole (Nov. 25, 1991), reprinted in 137
CONC. REC. S18,671 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991). The House nevertheless approved the crime
bill by a 205-203 vote. 137 CONG. REC. H11,756 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991). After the Senate
failed to agree to close debate on the conference report, however, Congress adjourned for the
year without taking final action on the legislation. 137 CONG. REC. S18,616 (daily ed. Nov. 27,
1991). Senator Joseph Biden criticized Senate Republicans for taking "the final step" that
"killed what would be the toughest anticrime law in U.S. history." Id- at S18,665.
4. See EDWARD PJ. CORBETr, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 3 (2d ed.
1971) (stating that rhetoric is about using language, either spoken or written, to inform, per-
suade, or move audience); CHAYM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC 5 (1982) (describing
rhetoric as entire range of discourse directed toward persuasion regardless of audience or
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rhetoric is to accuse the opponent of nothing more than trying to
persuade the audience that the person's position is the better one.
This does not mean that all rhetoric is above reproach, for there is
good rhetoric and bad rhetoric. Good rhetoric is grounded in logic
and sound reasoning. Bad rhetoric is grounded in fallacy. A fallacy
is a type of incorrect argument.5 A fallacious argument is one that
appears to be correct but proves upon scrutiny to be logically inva-
lid.6 Examples range from the familiar, such as "circular reasoning"
or "begging the question," to the esoteric, such as "affirming the
consequent" and the "undistributed middle term."' 7
Fallacious reasoning is bad rhetoric, but not because it is ineffec-
subject matter); W. Ross WINTERowD, RHETORIC, A SYNTHESIS 77 (1968) (defining rhetoric as
art of trying to persuade about any particular subject).
5. SeeJEREMY BENTHAM, THE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL FALLACIES 3 (Torchbook ed. 1962
of Harold A. Larrabee rev. ed. 1952) (1824) (defining fallacy as argument used for purpose of
deceiving); IRVING M. CoPx, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 52 (2d ed. 1961) (defining effect of fal-
lacy as making reasoning incorrect); W. WARD FEARNSIDE & WILLIAM B. HOLTHER, FALLACY:
THE COUNTERFEIT OF ARGUMENT 3 (1959) ("The word 'fallacy' is sometimes used as a syno-
nym for any kind of position that is false or deceptive, and sometimes it is applied in a more
narrow sense to a faulty process of reasoning or to tricky or specious persuasions."); C.L.
HAMBLIN, FAUACIES 12 (1970) ("A fallacious argument.., is one that seems to be valid but is not
so."); MADSEN PIRIE, THE BOOK OF THE FALLACY vii (1985) (defining fallacy as "[any trick of
logic or language which allows a statement or a claim to be passed offas something it is not").
Aristotle, from whose work all subsequent study of fallacies descended, defined fallacies in
much the same way:
That some reasonings are genuine, while others seem to be so but are not, is evident.
This happens with argument, as also elsewhere, through a certain likeness between
the genuine and the sham .... [B]oth reasoning and refutation are sometimes genu-
ine, sometimes not, though inexperience may make them appear so....
1 ARISTOTLE, De Sophisticis Elenchis, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 164' 1. 23 (W.D. Ross ed. &
W.A. Pickard-Cambridge trans., 1928) [hereinafter De Sophisticis Elenchis].
6. T. EDWARD DAMER, ATrACKING FAULTY REASONING 3 (1980).
7. See generally DAMER, supra note 6 (analyzing 64 fallacies). The fallacy of the "undis-
tributed middle term" results from inferring a conclusion from two premises where the mid-
dle term of the syllogism is not distributed to either premise. Ia at 122. Damer explains the
fallacy of "affirming the consequent" as a conditional statement that affirms the consequent
premise or statement instead of properly affirming the antecedent premise or statement. Id.
Aristotle originally classified 13 fallacies in De Sophisticis Elenchis. De Sophisticis Elenchis, supra
note 5, at 165 I. 23-169' 1. 22. He divided them into two groups: fallacies dependent on
language and fallacies not dependent on language. The fallacies dependent on language in-
cluded ambiguity, amphibole, combination, division of words, accent, and form of expression.
Id. at 165b 1. 25-165' 1. 28. The fallacies not dependent on language included those depen-
dent on accident, qualifications based on time, place, or relation, dependent on ignorance of
meaning or refutation, dependent on consequent, dependent on original premise, dependent
on causation, and dependent on joining several questions into one. Id. at 166b 1. 20-166b 1. 30.
David Fischer lists 11 groups of fallacies in his extraordinary work, Historians' Fallacies. See
DAVID H. FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES VIII, 337-38 (1970) (dividing each group into
seven or more individual fallacies for more than 100 specific definitions). Fearnside and
Holther discuss 51 fallacies in Fallacy: The Counterfeit Argument. See FEARNSIDE & HOLTIIER,
supra note 5, at v-vi (grouping specific fallacies into nine larger groups: faulty propositions,
faulty constructions, emotional coloration, misuse of authority, stirring up prejudice, rational-
ization and lip service, biased misconstructions, diversions, and logical fallacies).
Madsen Pirie's work, The Book of Fallacy, while not scholarly, is a useful guide to 76 different
fallacies. See PIRIE, supra note 5, at 183-87 (providing in lexicon format humorous and easily
understandable definitions of fallacies).
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tive as a tool of persuasion." In fact, quite the contrary is true.
Sadly, the lesson learned from the study of rhetoric is that while
being "right" is helpful it is not necessarily a prerequisite to win-
ning an argument. As demonstrated in this Article, fallacies can be
powerful tools of persuasion. A skilled sophist may employ fallacies
to divert the attention of listeners from the real issue being debated,
lead them to accept false premises or ignore conflicting evidence,
cause them to reason by emotion rather than by logic, or even fore-
stall them from questioning the speaker's position altogether. If ef-
fectiveness was used as a barometer for evaluating rhetoric, the
"good" and "bad" labels probably would have to be reversed.
Fallacies are bad rhetoric because they lead to bad decisionmak-
ing. The essential premise of this Article is that it is better to make
decisions based on straight thinking than on crooked thinking. 9
While this may seem to state the obvious, an examination of the
rhetoric used in virtually any political debate shows that we usually
do not abide by this principle in the arena of public decisionmaking.
As Jeremy Bentham documented more than one hundred and fifty
years ago, fallacies are common in the discussions of important so-
cial issues in democratic systems.10 Indeed, there seems to be a pos-
itive correlation between the importance of an issue, at least as
perceived by the populace, and our readiness to resort to bad rheto-
ric in debating it.
Gun control is a premiere example of such an issue. As demon-
strated by the debate over the Brady bill, few issues are capable of
generating such intense rhetorical conflict among the American
people. As with other controversial issues such as abortion and af-
firmative action, opinions about gun control are almost always pas-
sionately held and in diametric opposition.
Regrettably, while there is room for reasonable persons to disa-
gree about gun control,I' we have as a nation chosen to disagree in
8. DAMER, supra note 6, at 4.
9. See DAMER, supra note 6, at 4 (supporting premise that bad rhetoric, or rhetoric con-
taining error, often leads to faulty conclusions).
10. See BENTHAM, supra note 5, at 246 (arguing that fallacies flourish in political systems
that allow free speech and operate on basis of popular assent). Bentham argued that fallacy in
essence is fraud. Id He further believed that such fraud was used especially in democracies
because dictators who can resort to force do not need to resort to fraud. Id.
11. While there is fierce disagreement regarding the solution to gun violence, it is un-
likely that anyone would dispute the magnitude of the problem. Firearms are used to kill
more than 30,000 persons each year in the United States. THE GUN CONTROL DEBATE 12 (Lee
Nisbet ed., 1990) [hereinafter THE GuN CONTROL DEBATE]. Though precise statistics are not
available, it is estimated that for every firearm fatality there are five non-fatal firearm injuries.
Bill Stokes, Daily Devastation; Faulty Thinking About 'Accidents' Is Hurting Us More Than We Think,
CHi. TRIB., Oct. 7, 1990, (Sunday Good Health Magazine) at 8, 32.
Handguns, which are the target of most gun control efforts, are responsible for roughly
19921
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a most disagreeable manner. Excepting a limited number of schol-
arly commentaries, 12 discourse on gun control has been plagued by
bad rhetoric. The Brady bill debate exemplifies the prevalence of
poor rhetoric and defective reasoning in gun control argumenta-
tion. At its best, the debate over the Brady bill seldom rose above
the level of shrill hyperbole.' 3 At its worst, the discussion sank into
the muck of name-calling and non sequitur.14
22,000 of the annual firearm deaths. David L. Wilson, The Numbers Game: The Data Behind the
Policy, NAT'LJ.,July 21, 1990, at 1796. In 1988, 8,915 people were murdered with handguns
in the United States. Wayne King, Sarah and James Brady; Target: The Gun Lobby, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 1990, (Magazine), at 80. This compares with only 7 handgun murders in Great Brit-
ain, 8 in Canada, 19 in Sweden, and 53 in Switzerland. Id In addition, approximately 1,200
people die in accidental shootings in the United States each year. Wilson, supra, at 1796. The
majority of handgun deaths are suicides, which occur at the rate of about 12,000 per year. Id.
Every day in this country, 25 people are murdered with handguns, 33 women are raped at
gunpoint, 575 people are the victims of armed robberies, and 1,116 people are assaulted with
a gun. King, supra, at 80. Since 1984, there has been a 977% increase in youth firearm
murders. Youth Homicide and School Violence at Record Levels, New Center Research Shows, HANDGUN
CONTROL SEMI-ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT (Handgun Control, Inc., Washington, D.C.), Jan.
1991, at 6. Gun violence is the leading cause of death among African-American youths, ad-
ding a racial dimension to the tragedy. 137 CONG. REC. H2815 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (state-
ment of Rep. Norton). In 1988, 44% of all deaths among African-American males in the age
range from fifteen to twenty-four were caused by firearms. Id.
12. Most of the scholarly commentary regarding gun control relates to the proper inter-
pretation of the Second Amendment. Three symposia have been devoted primarily to this
issue. See generally Symposium, Gun Control and the Second Amendment, 15 U. DAYrON L.
REV. 1 (1989) (containing articles: Keith Ehrman & Dennis Henigan, The Second Amendment in
the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately? 5; Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Con-
stitutional Guarantees to Arms 59; Stephen Halbrook, Encroachments of the Crown on the Liberty of the
Subject: Pre-Revolutionary Origins of the Second Amendment 91;Joshua Horwitz, Kelley v. R.G. In-
dustries: A Cause ofActionfor Assault Weapons 125;JamesJacobs, The Regulation of Personal Chemi-
cal Weapons: Some Anomalies in American Weapons Law 141); Symposium, Gun Control, 49 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1986) (containing articles: James Jacobs, Exceptions to a General Prohibition
on Handgun Possession: Do They Swallow Up the Rule? 5; Gary Kleck, Policy Lessons from the Recent
Gun Control Research 35; Margaret Howard, Husband-Wife Homicide: An Essay From a Family Law
Perspective 63; Daniel Polsby, Reflections on Violence, Guns, and the Defensive Use of Lethal Force 89;
Lance Stell, Close Encounters of the Lethal Kin& The Use of Deadly Force in Self-Defense 113; Robert
Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic 125; Don Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A
Dialogue 143; Stephen Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Linquistic Analysis of the Right to
"Bear Arms" 15 1; Robert Batey, Strict Construction of Firearm Offenses: The Supreme Court and the
Gun Control Act of 1968 163; Alan Lizotte & Marjorie S. Zatz, The Use and Abuse of Sentence
Enhancement for Firearms Offenses in California 199; Note, The Public Use Test: Would a Ban on the
Possession of Firearms Require Just Compensation? 223;John Hasbo, Gun Control: A Selective Bibliog-
raphy 251); Second Amendment Symposium: Rights in Conflict in the 1980's, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 1
(1982) (containing articles: Edward Kennedy, The Handgun Crime Control Act of 1981 1; Ste-
phen Halbrook, To Keep and Bear Their Private Arms: The Adoption of the Second Amendment, 1787-
1791 13; Windle Turley, Manufacturers' and Suppliers' Liability to Handgun Victims 41; Richard E.
Gardiner, To Preserve Liberty - A Look at the Right to Keep and Bear Arms 63; Martin Ashman,
Handgun Control by Local Government 97; Ann Gottlieb, Gun Ownership: A Constitutional Right 113;
Samuel Fields, Guns, Crime and the Negligent Gun Owner 141; Darell Pierce, Comment, Second
Amendment Survey 155). For additional academic commentary regarding the Second Amend-
ment, see sources cited infra notes 200-01, 209.
13. See infra notes 124-40 and accompanying text (discussing hyperbole in context of
Brady bill debate).
14. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text (listing disparaging names used by
both supporters and opponents of Brady bill).
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This Article exposes the fallacies in the rhetoric of gun control.
Concentrating on the debate over the Brady bill, the Article guides
the reader through the treacherous terrain of gun control argumen-
tation by identifying and analyzing the wide variety of reasoning de-
fects employed by participants in the debate. The Article is process
oriented. No attempt is made to address the ultimate question of
whether the nation's gun policies should be reformed. Until we first
reform the debate, we cannot hope to approach law reform in a ra-
tional way.
In analyzing the rhetoric of gun control, I have attempted to be
fair and balanced, attacking the flaws in reasoning on both sides of
the debate. As a proponent of gun control, I initially thought this
approach would prove difficult. Gun control advocates like to be-
lieve that only those who oppose gun control are guilty of deceptive
and fallacious rhetoric, but scrutiny of the Brady bill debate reveals
that this assumption is false.' 5 The pro-Brady bill forces contrib-
15. See infra notes 46-49, 90, 104, 112, 116, 133, 166, 177, 183 and accompanying text
(giving examples of fallacious or deceptive reasoning used by gun control advocates). Tradi-
tionally, the rhetoric of gun control was largely one sided, flowing predominantly from the
anti-gun control movement. This perceived lopsidedness was fueled at least partially by the
success of the National Rifle Association (NRA) in controlling the debate. See Alex
Prud'homme, A Blow to the NRA; The House Takes an Overdue Standfor Gun Control, TIME, May 20,
1991, at 26 (asserting that NRA traditionally overpowered rival gun control organizations by
having more than twice as many members and 10 times greater budget). Representative
Charles E. Schumer characterized the NRA's control on Congress as a "stranglehold," cou-
pled with an "aura of invincibility." ME. In 1991, the organization had a staff of 450, 2.6
million members, and boasted an annual budget of $87 million. Michael Isikoff, NRA Selects
Hard-Liner as Gun Bill Battle Nears, WASH. PosT, Apr. 16, 1991, at A5.
One factor in the NRA's dominance of the rhetorical arena has been its intimidation strat-
egy. Consider this resolution adopted by the NRA at a 1990 meeting in response to the suc-
cess of recent state and federal gun control initiatives:
WHEREAS this unprecedented string of legislative defeats and outrageous polit-
ical backstabbing cannot and will not be tolerated by the membership of this Associa-
tion,
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the membership of the National Rifle As-
sociation of America . . . pledges that we shall not soon forgive, and shall never
forget, the betrayals of those politicians who once sought our support and will need
it again ....
Members Meeting Adopts Resolution, AMER. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1990, at 50.
Experience has shown that the NRA backs up its threats. After former Representative Peter
Smith spoke out in favor of legislation to ban assault weapons, the NRA spent approximately
$20,000 on a direct mail and advertising campaign to unseat him from the House of Repre-
sentatives. Stephanie Saul, NRA Takes Aim at Brady Bill, NEwsDAY, Apr. 16, 1991, at 19. He
lost his bid for reelection. Id. Smith said the NRA created an "aura of anger" against him that
prompted NRA supporters to shoot at his campaign signs, harass his family by telephone, and
try to run his mother's car off the road. Id An NRA spokesperson said the organization does
not condone such conduct. Id. Yet the unmistakable message the organization sends to poli-
ticians is that it is a mistake to oppose or hinder the NRA. Id.
The climate has changed in recent years, however. As gun violence continues to escalate,
more and louder voices are being heard from the other side. A pro-gun control lobbying
organization named Handgun Control, Inc. (HCI) has emerged as a formidable counter-
weight in the gun control debate. Michael Isikoff, The Brady Bill: Success and Growing Pains,
WASH. Pos-r, May 31, 1991, at A17 [hereinafter Isikoff, The Brady Bill]. While it still lags far
1992]
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uted more than enough bad rhetoric to the gun control debate to
allow for relatively evenhanded treatment of the two sides of the
issue.1 6
The importance of dissecting gun control rhetoric extends be-
yond the issue of gun control, or even law reform in general. Un-
derstanding rhetoric is a process every student of the law should
care about. Rhetoric is the art of persuasion and persuasion is the
lawyer's stock in trade. Advocates cannot be completely effective
unless they first master the tools of advocacy. Learning to distin-
guish between good rhetoric and bad rhetoric, that is, learning to
recognize and identify flaws in reasoning, is an essential part of
every lawyer's education.
I. REASON: THE MISSING LINK IN GUN CONTROL RHETORIC
The foundation of reasoned, rational discourse concerning gun
control is surprisingly thin. Many Americans would be shocked to
learn that an issue they consider vitally important' 7 is not treated as
important by those with the power to make it so. For example, the
United States Supreme Court has analyzed the Second Amendment
behind the NRA in resources, HCI boasts a $6.5 million annual budget and a mailing list of
more than one million supporters. Id. Regrettably, as this Article indicates, improved balance
has done little to improve the content of the gun control debate. As more pro-gun control
voices are being heard, so also is much of the same bad rhetoric suffered under the empery of
the NRA. See infra notes 90-110 and accompanying text (providing examples of bad rhetoric
in context of Brady bill debate).
16. See infra notes 46-49, 90, 104, 112, 116, 133, 166, 177, 183 and accompanying text
(providing examples of bad rhetoric used by proponents of Brady bill). I make no pretense of
complete objectivity. While an awareness and understanding of fallacies makes it easier to
avoid them, no one can be entirely immune from the self-deception that taints his or her
reasoning concerning emotionally charged issues. See infra notes 255-57 and accompanying
text (discussing fallacies that arise as result of self-deception). The ease with which one can
succumb to fallacious reasoning became painfully obvious to me when I reviewed an earlier
piece I had written advocating strict liability for handgun manufacturers. To my chagrin, I
recognized some of the same emotionally based fallacies that I attack herein. See Andrew J.
McClurg, Handguns as Products Unreasonably Dangerous Per Se, 13 U. ARK. LrME ROCK LJ. 599
(1991).
17. Some evidence of the importance of this issue to the American public is found in the
attention devoted to the Brady bill debate by the popular media. A search of the LEXIS Omni
file on July 17, 1992, using the search term "Brady bill," disclosed 1,732 articles discussing
the bill. Search of LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file (July 17, 1992). Another indication of the
issue's importance to the American people is their willingness to contribute money to the
cause. The NRA's $87 million annual budget and the fledgling HCI's $6.5 million annual
budget attest that gun control is a cause in which Americans are willing to invest. See supra
note 15 (discussing activities of NRA and HCI).
The passion with which people hold their views concerning gun control became apparent to
me while delivering presentations on the subject to high school students. During one such
presentation, a young woman from rural Arkansas raised her hand and asked me to name the
most important thing in the universe to me. Bewildered, I answered that it would be my
daughter. With conviction seldom seen, she said the most important thing to her was a pearl-
handled revolver that her grandmother had given her and that she would shoot anyone who
tried to take it away from her. I encountered similar sentiments from several other students.
THE RHETORIC OF GUN CONTROL
in a substantive context in only one case this century I8 and in only
four cases in history.19 And as Professor Sanford Levinson noted in
a recent article, the Second Amendment appears in leading constitu-
tional law casebooks only as part of the text of the Constitution,
which is generally reprinted in the casebooks' appendices. 20 He fur-
ther observed that constitutional law treatises devote only minimal
attention to the Amendment. 21
This deficiency in what I call professional discourse makes the is-
sue of gun control disturbingly unique. Discourse concerning issues
of law reform usually occurs at two levels: popular and professional.
Popular discourse is discourse among and for dissemination to the
populace and includes lunch room banter, letters to the editors of
newspapers and magazines, and congressional floor debate. Profes-
sional discourse consists of legal argument, judicial opinions, and
scholarly commentary. Such discourse generally occurs in a more
carefully reasoned manner.
There is both less room and less cause for the appearance of falla-
cies in the context of professional discourse. For example, although
fallacies of reasoning are not uncommon in judicial decisions, 22
judges at least try to justify their results using sound logic. 28 Judges
18. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 177-83 (1939) (reversing district court deci-
sion that National Firearms Act violated Second Amendment); see also infra notes 206-16 (dis-
cussing Miller in context of Second Amendment).
19. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 177-83; Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1894) (dis-
missing Second Amendment challenge to Texas gun control statute for lack ofjurisdiction);
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 258-67 (1886) (holding that Second Amendment only re-
stricts power of Congress and Federal Government, not power of states); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (holding that Second Amendment does not create right
to bear arms but rather that right exists independent from Constitution). In 1991, the Court
declined an opportunity to interpret the Second Amendment when it denied certiorari in
Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 753 (1991). The
issue in Farmer was whether the Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)
(1988), prohibits private possession of machine guns not lawfully possessed prior to the stat-
ute's effective date. Farmer, 907 F.2d at 1042. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
denied Farmer, the plaintiff, permission to make and register a machine gun, so he filed an
action for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus to compel the Bureau to approve his
application. Id. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ignored Farmer's Second Amend-
ment claim and held that the Act did indeed impose a blanket ban on private possession of
machine guns not lawfully possessed prior to the Act's effective date. Id. at 1045.
20. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE LJ. 637, 639 n.14
(1989).
21. Id. Levinson also noted that only one article concerning the Second Amendment
(other than his) has ever appeared in an "elite" law journal. i at 639 n.13 (citing Don Kates,
Handgun Prohibition and the Orinal Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204
(1983)).
22. See PIERRE SCHLAG & DAVID SKOVER, TAcTIcs OF LEGAL REASONING 55-105 (1986)
(analyzing reasoning defects in representative cases in areas of property law, criminal law,
constitutional law, and tort law); see also Andrew J. McClurg, Logical Fallacies and the Supreme
Court: A Critical Examination ofJstice Rehnquist's Decisions in Criminal Procedure Cases, 59 U. CoLo.
L. REV. 741, 762-832 (1988) (analyzing fallacies injustice Rehnquist's opinions).
23. This is not to say that the reasons given in a written opinion are the real bases for the
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are prevented from succumbing too readily to fallacy by their legal
training and ethical responsibilities, 24 and because their audience,
which consists largely of lawyers and other judges, demands good
reasoning.25 Moreover, because theirs is an educated audience that
is capable of and willing to digest complex reasoning, judges have
less cause to utilize fallacies to prove their points. Judges can write
opinions knowing that their rhetoric will not be evaluated solely on
the basis of a ten-second "sound bite." 26
The same conditions hold true with respect to other professional
participants in the law reform process. Law students are trained to
decision. Jerome Frank and other American legal realists convincingly attacked the conven-
tional notion that judges decide cases through deductive logic by applying neutral legal rules
to objectively determined facts. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the
Juridical Field, 38 HATINGS L.J. 805, 825 (1987) (stating that legal realists demonstrated im-
possibility of perfectly rational judicial methodology); Allan Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan,
The "Rights" Stuff Robert Unger and Beyond, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1477, 1507 (1984) (explaining
legal realists' position that deductive logic cannot resolve all doctrinal ambiguity). The real-
ists asserted that judicial results can best be explained by reference to external stimuli that
form a judge's values, prejudices, disposition, or temperament. See, e.g. ,JEROME FRANK, LAW
AND THE MODERN MIND 119 (1930) (positing that emotions, biases, and prejudices ofjudges
impede flexibility and predictability ofjudicial system); Charles G. Haines, General Observations
on the Effects of Personal, Political and Economic Influences in the Decisions ofJudges, 17 U. ILL. L. REV.
98, 116 (1922) (citing factors such as judges' educational background, family and personal
associations, wealth and social positions, legal and political experiences, political affiliations
and opinions, and intellectual and temperamental habits as key guideposts in determining
which way judge will decide case); Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 466 (1897) (arguing that judges make particular choices in deciding cases because of
beliefs as to community or class practices and because of policy opinions or general attitudes
toward matters); see also Ex Parte Chase, 43 Ala. 303, 311 (1869) (suggesting that judicial
power may be misdirected "by a fit of temporary sickness, an extra mint julep, or the smell or
looks of a peculiar raincoat").
The fact that written opinions follow a logical form, the realists argued, is irrelevant be-
cause courts have great leeway in selecting the premises necessary to achieve this structure.
As author Jerome Frank has written:
The court can decide one way or the other and in either case can make its reasoning
appear equally flawless. Formal logic is what its name indicates; it deals with form
and not with substance. The syllogism will not supply either the major premise or
the minor premise. The "joker" is to be found in the selection of these premises.
FRANK, supra, at 72; see also Holmes, supra, at 465-66 ("The language of the judicial decision is
mainly the language of logic.... You can give any conclusion a logical form.").
24. See AMERICAN BAR Assoc., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr AND CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT 138 (1989) (stating in Canon 3 that "[a] judge should perform the duties
of his office impartially and diligently").
25. Early in my legal career, while clerking for the Honorable Charles R. Scott, late
United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, I learned a valuable lesson
about judging: that a primary motivation for judges in deciding any case is to avoid being
reversed by an appellate court. Reversal not only means extra work, it is the judicial
equivalent of having a big, red "F" slashed across a test paper. Judge Scott used to refer to
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals as "my master's voice."
26. "Sound bite" is a term used to characterize the terse and abbreviated treatment af-
forded by the modem television news media to the discussion of often complex social issues
by political candidates, with the effect of encouraging politicians to mold their public state-
ments with this coverage in mind. The result in many instances is overly dramatic and overly
simplified debate on important public issues.
THE RHETORIC OF GUN CONTROL
reason well. 27 They learn early on that their professors will not ac-
cept emotional or "gut" reactions that are unsupported by reasoned
argument. Similarly, judges demand that lawyers present sound ar-
guments to support their positions. While fallacies no doubt occur,
reason predominates.
As to most important law reform issues, discourse occurs simulta-
neously at both the popular and professional levels. While the pub-
lic is debating abortion, for example, lawyers are arguing, judges are
deciding, law students are studying, and scholars are writing about
real cases involving abortion. This professional discourse serves as
an anchor of reason in the debate; that is, no matter how bombastic
or outrageous the popular discourse becomes, a foundation of ra-
tionality exists in the professional dialogue that is available to guide
the decisionmaking of those vested with power to reform the law.
In contrast, the gun control debate lacks an adequate body of pro-
fessional discourse,28 leaving us with only the "low road" of popular
discourse to guide us toward resolving this vital issue. As seen in
this Article, it is a very low road indeed. In recent years, the gun
control debate has taken on the "anything goes" appearance of a
professional wrestling match. The rules of intellectually honest de-
bate are ignored. Illicit stratagems designed to gain competitive ad-
vantage are as likely to be cheered as jeered. As a member of the
audience watching this ugly contest, I have never been quite sure
whether to sit back and laugh at the absurdity of it all or to jump in
the ring swinging a chair. I finally concluded that a debate in which
fallacy so completely obscures reason is not simply unproductive, it
is a dangerous way to decide an issue as important as gun control.
Regardless of one's views concerning gun control generally or the
Brady bill in particular, the defective arguments catalogued in this
Article should give the reader good reason to pause and reassess the
means by which the American people will decide the future of guns
in this country.
II. THE FALLACIES OF GUN CONTROL RHETORIC
The fallacies of gun control rhetoric tend to be informal rather
than formal fallacies. Formal fallacies are arguments that are defec-
27. See Alan D. Hornstein, The Myth of Legal Reasoning, 40 MD. L. REv. 338, 339 (1981)
(deconstructing steps involved in legal reasoning and pointing out similarities between legal
reasoning and other forms of formal reasoning). While law professors are fond of telling
students that law school trains them to "think like lawyers," I agree with Professor Hornstein
that this really means nothing more than learning to reason well. Id.
28. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (citing significant scholarly works on issue of
gun control).
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tive because of improper form, without regard to content.29 Argu-
ment form is dictated by the rules of logic developed in the context
of Aristotelian syllogisms.30 Syllogisms are analyzed by logicians
in terms of their validity rather than their truth. In formal logic,
validity depends only on the form of the argument. Content is
irrelevant.3 1 In the world of practical argumentation, however, the
content of an argument is vital.
To illustrate, suppose that a person opposed to gun control ad-
vanced the following syllogistic argument:
The Second Amendment protects an individual's right to keep
and bear any type of arm.
A nuclear weapon is a type of arm.
Therefore, the Second Amendment protects an individual's right
to keep and bear nuclear weapons.
This syllogism is perfectly valid from a formal standpoint, yet any
audience would most likely reject the argument because the content
is flawed. The audience would dispute the truth of the major prem-
ise that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to
possess any type of arm. This illustration demonstrates that while
content is not a concern of formal logic, content is crucial to the
soundness of practical argumentation. The label used to denote all
such content-based fallacies is that of "informal fallacy."
No attempt has been made to classify the fallacies evaluated in
this Article in a rigorously systematic way. As De Morgan said:
"There is no such thing as a classification of the ways in which men
may arrive at error: it is much to be doubted whether there ever can
be." 32 Several scholars have made efforts to categorize fallacies, but
each attempt has had rather arbitrary results.3 3 This is not surpris-
29. See MORRIS COHEN & ERNEST NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO Lo;ic AND SCIENTIFIC
METHOD 376 (1934) (describing structural flaw inherent in formal fallacy).
30. A syllogism is a deductive argument consisting of three terms (major, middle, and
minor) and three propositions (major premise, minor premise, and conclusion). Deductive
arguments are those in which the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. If the
premises of the syllogism are true and the syllogism is valid, the conclusion must be true. The
following example from Aristotle is illustrative:
All men are mortal;
Socrates is a man;
therefore Socrates is a mortal.
I ARISTOTLE, Analytica Priora, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2 5 b 1. 38 (W.D. Ross ed., AJ. Jen-
kinson trans., 1928) [hereinafter Analytica Piiora]. For a more extensive explanation of syllo-
gisms, see COHEN & NAGEL, supra note 29, at 76-78 and Copi, supra note 5, at 168-71.
Aristotle's classic discussion of the syllogism is found in Analytica P'iora. Analytica Priora, supra,
at 241 1. 10.
31. See Copi, supra note 5, at 33 ("mrlhe truth or falsehood of [an argument's] conclusion
does not determine the validity or invalidity of an argument.... The logician is interested in
the correctness even of arguments whose premises might be false.").
32. AUGUsTUs DE MORGAN, FORMAL LOGIC 237 (A.E. Taylor ed., 2d ed. 1926) (1847).
33. See, e.g., De Sophisticis Elenchis, supra note 5, at 16 5b 1. 23-168' 1. 17 (explaining Aris-
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ing. Because we do not think in fixed ways, there is no reason to
believe the reasonings we construct can be classified in fixed ways.3 4
Moreover, any attempt to classify fallacies is immediately stalled by
the fact that a single argument may contain several fallacies. This
overlap necessitates cross-divisions that invariably dilute the classi-
fication scheme. Accordingly, this Article adopts a simple method
of classification, dividing the fallacies of gun control into three
broad categories: fallacies of emotion, fallacies of diversion, and fal-
lacies of proof. Within each category, several specific fallacies are
discussed.
A. Fallacies of Emotion
1. Appeals to fear and sympathy
In arguing against the Brady bill on the House floor, Representa-
tive Barbara Vucanovich, a Republican from Nevada, invoked the
tragic episode of serial murders that occurred in Gainesville, Florida
in the summer of 1990.35 She posed the following query: "If the
Brady bill were law, who knows how many more young women
would be dead in Gainesville because they had to wait to protect
totle's division of his 13 original fallacies into two groups: fallacies dependent on language
and fallacies outside language); supra note 7 (listing classifications of fallacies devised by sev-
eral authors). Aristotle's fallacies dependent on language all involve problems arising from
the ambiguity of language. De Sophisticis Elenchis, supra note 5, at 1651 1. 23-168' 1. 17. For
example, equivocation, the simplest case of ambiguity, occurs when a word is used in two
different senses in the same context, as in the following example:
Some dogs have fuzzy ears.
My dog has fuzzy ears.
Therefore my dog is some dog.
CopI, supra note 5, at 74. This syllogism is fallacious because it confuses two different mean-
ings of the word "some." In the first premise, "some" is used to mean a portion of the whole;
in the second, the term means "exceptional" or "great." The fallacies dependent on lan-
guage are seldom encountered in the real world of practical argumentation, however. While
Aristotle's fallacies dependent on language constitute a relatively coherent class, his fallacies
outside language do not have any common feature except that most of the fallacies could be
labeled as material fallacies rather than simply as fallacies of form. SeeJOSEPH G. BRENNAN, A
HANDBOOK OF LOGIC 208-23 (2d ed. 1961) (critiquing prior categorizations of fallacies, in-
cluding Aristotle's).
34. In expounding his relatively cogent classification of fallacies, Richard Whately
commented:
If any one should object, that the division about to be adopted is in some degree
arbitrary, placing under the one head Fallacies, which many might be disposed to
place under the other, let him consider not only the indistinctness of all former divi-
sions, but the utter impossibility of framing any that shall be completely secure from
the objection urged, in a case where men have formed such various and vague no-
tions, from the very want of some clear principle of division.
RICHARD WHATELY, ELEMENTS OF LOGIC 136 (Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints 1975) (2d ed.
1827).
35. See Peter Applebome, Panic on a Florida Campus After 5 Are Slain, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
1990, at Al (documenting murder of five students at universities in Gainesville, Florida, in
August 1990).
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themselves."3 6 Then, in almost the same breath, she urged her fel-
low representatives "not to let their judgments be clouded by the
antigun lobby's emotional banter."3 7
The representative should practice what she preaches. Conjuring
up the nightmarish image of defenseless coeds being butchered by a
mad killer was a blatant attempt to use emotion to generate opposi-
tion to the Brady bill. Appeals to emotion are fallacious because
emotions are irrelevant as a basis for deciding an issue. While emo-
tions have psychological relevance in that they have a persuasive
impact on the human mind, they have no logical relevance because
they are incapable of establishing the truth of conclusions.38
Proving truth requires the mustering of convincing evidence and
not simply the exploitation of emotional sensitivities.3 9 Emotions
may move us to act, but reason should control the course of that
action.40
Vucanovich committed at least three fallacies of emotion in one
sentence: argumentum ad odium (argument directed to hatred), argu-
mentum ad metum (argument directed to fear), and argumentum ad mis-
ericordiam (argument directed to pity).41 Her appeal to these
emotions was particularly irrelevant because a handgun waiting pe-
riod would have had little effect on the events in Gainesville. There
is no indication that any of the victims was killed because a waiting
period kept her from purchasing a handgun, or that any potential
victim used a handgun to repel, apprehend, or kill the killer. Vuca-
novich was simply attempting to provoke opposition to the Brady
bill by fabricating an association between the bill and the strong
emotions aroused by the serial killings. Vucanovich played on our
hatred and fear of serial murderers, as well as our feelings of pity for
the murder victims. 42 None of this, however, has anything to do
36. 137 CONG. REC. H2859 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Vucanovich).
37. Id
38. See Cop, supra note 5, at 53, 58-61 (discussing appealing reasons for use of fallacies).
Emotions must be distinguished from reasoning based on values and moral judgments, which
are relevant to rational decisionmaking. See infra note 121 and accompanying text (ex-
pounding difference between use and misuse of emotions in argument).
39. See DAMER, supra note 6, at 87 (discussing how interplay of emotion and persuasion
often leads to failure to present evidence that is persuasive independent of emotional aspect).
40. See PIRIE, supra note 5, at 58 (citing Scottish philosopher David Hume as the source
of stated observation).
41. See HAMBLIN, supra note 5, at 161 (creditingJohn Locke with inventing "argumentum
ad" labels). Scholars of rhetoric still use these Latin names. Some, like ad hominen, have
become part of the English lexicon.
42. Like many other fallacies, appeals to pity have a distinguished pedigree. Quoting
from Plato's Apology, Copi sets out a portion of Socrates' defense of himself in which he re-
minds the judges that he is a family man with three young sons, in order to persuade the
judges of his innocence. Cop, supra note 5, at 59. Logically, Socrates' family situation was
irrelevant to the question of his guilt.
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with whether the Brady bill should become law.
Unfortunately, Vucanovich's salvo was not unique. Fallacies of
emotion are one of the hallmarks of gun control rhetoric. Vuca-
novich's emotional banter was no worse than some of the gun
lobby's other scare tactics. After the 1992 Los Angeles riots that
followed in the wake of the jury's decision to acquit most of the po-
lice officers charged with using excessive force against motorist
Rodney King, the National Rifle Association (NRA) employed a
four-page advertisement to boost membership by shamelessly ex-
ploiting the fear and horror generated by images of the violence.43
The advertisement, featuring color pictures of looters and burning
buildings, asked: "Must your glass be shattered? Must your flesh
and blood be maimed? Must your livelihood be looted? Must all
you've built be torn down?... What will it take before you stand up
with the one group that will standfor no more?"44 Such tactics are not
new. In 1988, the year Congress first considered the Brady bill, the
NRA paid for full-page newspaper advertisements that were
designed to incite people's fear of being unarmed in an increasingly
dangerous and violent America. 45 One advertisement depicted a
woman's mangled locket under the headline: "Your mother just
surprised two burglars who don't like surprises." 46 Another showed
a high-heel shoe with the heel broken off. It read: "He's followed
you for two weeks. He'll rape you in two minutes." 47
Fear is a great motivator, but'in the gun control debate fear cuts
both ways. It may be dangerous for potential victims of criminals to
be unarmed, but this is partly because many criminals are armed.
Not surprisingly, then, the strategy of preying on fear of violent
crime has never been the exclusive province of the gun lobby. Con-
sider a law review article adapted from a speech given by Senator
Edward Kennedy urging passage of the Handgun Control Act of
43. NATIONAL RIFLE ASS'N, WHAT WILL IT TAKE? (1992) (magazine advertisement on file
with The American University Law Review).
44. Id The following are additional excerpts from the advertisement:
The evil in L.A. was just a concentrated form of the one-on-one evil that stalks
America every nightfall, untouched by gun laws and ignored by media. In dark park-
ing lots instead of crowded streets. Smashing through bedroom windows instead of
store windows. Demolishing lives instead of whole neighborhoods. One lonely wo-
man at a time, one businessman at a time, one family at a time, one innocent victim at
a time.
Id
45. See Mark Udulutch, Note, The Constitutional Implications of Gun Control and Several Realis-
tic Gun Control Proposals, 17 AM.J. CRIM. L. 19, 21 n.14 (1989) (citing Go Ahead, Make Our Day,
THE NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1988, at 7) (stating that Washington Post, New York Times, and
other major publications ran series of nine such advertisements sponsored by NRA).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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1981. 4 8 The Senator's essential point was that we need legislation
to control handguns because of the prevalence of handgun violence.
Rather than express this sentiment in such prosaic terms, however,
he opted for loaded words and phrases like "fusillade of bullets,"
"'carnage," "assassin," "fears and ... tears,". "haunted, .... end the
arms race in our neighborhoods," "relentless toll climbs higher,"
"epidemic," and "plagues the Nation."' 49 And this was all in just the
first four paragraphs! Emotive words and phrases such as these are
designed to prejudice an argument by illicitly achieving a more dra-
matic effect than could be attained through reason alone.50
While Senator Kennedy's plea went unanswered, 51 other emo-
tional appeals, drawing from an ever-expanding inventory of gun-
related horrors, have proven more effective in tipping the balance of
fear toward the side of gun control. In the Brady bill debate, propo-
nents used grisly anecdotes and numbing statistics to convince the
American people that there is more to fear from criminals having
guns than from non-criminals not having guns.5 2 No stratagem ca-
pable of evoking strong emotions was overlooked. Indeed, the
name of the bill itself served as a powerful emotional symbol.
Handgun Control, Iric., the Washington based anti-gun lobbying or-
ganization led by chairwoman Sarah Brady, exploited popular sym-
pathy forJim Brady by running advertisements showing Brady in his
wheelchair, saying "[h]elp me beat the gun lobby."53 Some mem-
bers of Congress buttressed their support of the bill with inspired
testimonials to Jim and Sarah Brady.5 4 Others set their emotional
sights more broadly, mourning the plight of beleaguered old peo-
ple, innocent children, terrorized families, and police officers on
48. See Edward M. Kennedy, The Handgun Crime Control Act of 1981, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 1
(1982) (presenting text of speech Senator Kennedy delivered on Senate floor on April 9,
1981).
49. Id at 1-2.
50. See PIRIE, supra note 5, at 111 (describing numerous effects emotionally loaded words
may have on receiver of argument).
51. Richard Wolf, Crime Bill Killed by Political Cross Fire, USA TODAy, Nov. 27, 1991, at A4
(citing failure of Senate to pass crime bill prior to end of legislative session).
52. See Alison Carper, Clear Shot to N. Y for Running Firearms, NEwsDAv, May 8, 1991, at 7
(depicting infant accidentally killed in crib by illegally purchased gun to support gun control);
U.S. Murder Rate Appears Headed for a Record Year, L.A. TMES, Aug. 5, 1991, at A16 (using
extensive statistics to support passage of Brady bill).
53. Saul, supra note 15, at 85.
54. See 137 CoNG. REC. H2845 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Downey) ("Let
us not forgetJim Brady.... Let us make sure thatJim Brady's suffering was not in vain."); id.
at H2833 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Fish) (stating that "Uim and Sarah Brady]
both decided that after Jim's shooting they would rather light a candle than curse the dark-
ness, and the Brady bill .. . is indeed that candle"). Whether the Brady bill would have
prevented John Hinckley from purchasing the handgun used to shoot Jim Brady is by no
means clear. See infra note 56 (discussing debate on whether gun control legislation would
have prevented Jim Brady's injury).
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These references to innocent firearm victims, while relevant to the
overall gun control debate, are fallacious arguments in support of
the Brady bill. They would be germane to the Brady bill contro-
versy only if some logical connection could be shown between the
victims' plight and the lack of waiting periods or background checks
for handgun purchasers. Few participants in the debate attempted
to establish any such connection, however, probably because it
would be difficult to do.56 For one thing, the Brady bill would not
affect the estimated 200 million firearms 57 already in circulation.
5 8
Whatever good the Brady bill might do, no one can seriously con-
tend that the bill could, by itself, reduce the level of gun violence in
55. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. H2868-69 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Owens) ("Every week innocent people, including children, are murdered .... These inno-
cent adults and children are killed only because they were in the wrong place at the wrong
time. And all too often that wrong place is a crib, a family car, or a living room."); id at
H2845 (statement of Rep. Downey) ("Older citizens are forced to stay in their homes at night
behind locked doors, while criminals rule the streets. Innocent children are terrorized and
threatened. Once quiet neighborhoods have become bloody battlegrounds."); id at H2827
(statement of Rep. Weiss) ("Stray bullets have turned mainstreet U.S.A. into a firing range.");
id. at H2825 (statement of Rep. Slaughter) (referring to shootouts resulting in children's
deaths in New York City); Elaine S. Povich, House Passes Brady Bill; Handgun Control Measure
Survives Furious NRA Lobbying, CI. TRIB., May 9, 1991, at I (quoting Representative Charles
Schumer as saying, "Every child that is still growing up, every cop that still patrols his beat,
every family that remains intact-they silently ask us to approve the Brady bill.").
56. See David B. Kopel, Why Gun Waiting Periods Threaten Public Safety (Mar. 25,
1991) (unpublished issue paper from Independence Institute), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC.
S9046-47 (daily ed. June 28, 1991) [hereinafter Kopel] (noting that Sarah Brady and HCI
assert that waiting period and background check would have prevented John Hinckley from
purchasing cheap handgun he used to shoot President Reagan and Jim Brady, but pointing
out that such result is far from clear). Hinckley bought the gun he used in the assassination
attempt from a Texas gun shop in October 1980, which was several months before the shoot-
ing occurred. Id. Thus, Kopel asserts that a waiting period "would obviously have had no
impact." l Other than the possibility that Hinckley might have changed his mind about
purchasing the gun had he been required to wait a few days, this is true.
As to the efficacy of a background check, Hinckley was not a convicted felon and, while he
had been treated for mental illness, no public record of his illness existed. Thus, a back-
ground check would not have disclosed his illness. Id. The basis for Sarah Brady and HCI's
claim that a background check would have prevented the assassination attempt is that Hinck-
ley lied about his address when he purchased the gun, using an old Texas driver's license as
verification. lId Mrs. Brady claims that a background check would have uncovered this lie,
and thus Hinckley would not have been permitted to buy a handgun in Texas. Id. Kopel
asserts, however, that a false statement on the federal firearm transaction form would not by
itself make the purchase transaction illegal. Id He notes that federal law requires a gun
purchaser to furnish identification only to prove residence in the state of purchase, and not to
verify an in-state address. lId So long as Hinckley was a Texas resident, Kopel argues, the
transaction would have been legal. Il Kopel then makes a case for Hinckley's Texas resi-
dency based on his attendance at Texas Tech University the summer preceding the assassina-
tion attempt. Id.
57. Erik Eckholm, Ailing Gun Industry Confronts Outrage over Glut of Violence, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 1992, at Al.
58. See S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2701-2703 (1991) (proposing regulations for
new firearm purchases only).
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America. 59 The connection Brady bill supporters sought to make
between the legislation and senseless handgun violence was largely
an emotional one i la Congresswoman Vucanovich or Senator Ken-
nedy, rather than a logical one.60
2. Appeals to pride and popular opinion
Not all the fallacies of emotion are negative in tenor. Resorting to
the fallacy of argumentum adpopulum, both sides in the Brady bill con-
test manipulated positive popular sentiments as well as negative
ones. There are several variations of argumentum ad populum, which
translates to "argument directed to the people." As used here, the
fallacy refers to appeals to popular opinion that stimulate and excite
the public to favor a particular position. 6'
Appeals to national pride and patriotism are particularly attractive
strategies for politicians. The Persian Gulf War served as fertile
ground for these types of appeals. For example, one House mem-
ber argued that Congress should approve the Brady bill because
"[a]s we learned in the gulf, the best way to defeat the enemy is to
disarm him first." 62 Another representative urged his colleagues to
"deal with handgun violence as quickly as we dealt with Saddam
Hussein and his Republican Guard."'63 Not to be outdone, Brady
bill opponents alluded to General Norman Schwarzkopf and Eastern
European freedom fighters as reminders of the preciousness of free-
dom.64 Recalling less recent symbols of patriotic pride, an NRA vice
president, apparently with a straight face, asked, "What if they had
to wait seven days to get their rifles to come to the Alamo and
59. See Kopel, supra note 56, at S9048-49 (citing criminological studies showing that
waiting periods have little effect on number of crimes committed with guns).
60. Gun control advocates stooped even lower in the related battle over assault weapons.
Rivaling the NRA for bad taste, Handgun Control, Inc. sponsored an advertisement showing
a hooded Ku Klux Klansman clutching a Colt AR-15 under the headline: "Why Is the NRA
Allowing HIM Easy Access to Assault Weapons?" Isikoff, The Brady Bill, supra note 15, at A 17.
The Senate voted to ban the manufacture and sale of 14 types of assault weapons as part of
the Senate Violent Crime Control Act of 1991, a broad-based crime control statute that also
included the Senate's version of the Brady bill. S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 703 (1991).
However, the assault weapon ban failed to pass the House by the surprisingly large margin of
247 to 177. Michael Isikoff, House Rejects Attempt to Ban Assault Guns, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 18,
1991, at Al, A20. The proposal ultimately was scrapped by House and Senate conferees.
Houston, supra note 3, at 1.
61. See generally CopI, supra note 5, at 60-61 (defining ad populum appeal as attempt to
arouse feelings and enthusiasm of multitudes); DAMER, supra note 6, at 89-91 (analyzing sev-
eral distinct appeals to popular opinion).
62. See Is Seven Days Too Long to Wait to Purchase a Handgun, USA TODAY, May 7, 1991, at
10A (quoting statement by Representative Charles Schumer).
63. 137 CONG. REc. H2851 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Stokes).
64. Id. at H2837 (statement of Rep. DeLay).
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fight? ' 65 Even references to apple pie made it into the debate.66
Again, the flaw here is irrelevance. American pride in our per-
formance in the Gulf War has nothing to do with whether it is wise
to impose a waiting period and a background check on handgun
purchases. General Schwarzkopf and the Eastern European coun-
tries may be powerful symbols of freedom, but they have no connec-
tion to the wisdom or constitutionality of the Brady bill. As for the
Alamo, ignoring the unfortunate result there, the Brady bill does
not apply to rifles, to the military, or to the 200 million guns already
owned by American citizens. Thus, Texans should fare well if at-
tacked again from the south, even if the Brady bill is enacted. Each
of these appeals to patriotism and national pride, while probably
persuasive to a mass audience, missed the mark of reason by a wide
margin.
3. Appeals to improper sources of authority
Positive emotions toward a position can also be engendered by
appealing to popular personalities; that is, speakers can promote the
credibility of their arguments by aligning themselves with persons of
outstanding character and reputation who share their views. This is
not fallacious if these authorities have specialized knowledge con-
cerning the problems they address. It is quite proper to call on
qualified experts to assist laypersons in making decisions concern-
ing matters beyond their knowledge and experience. Lawyers,
judges, and juries do it every day.
But where the person is not qualified as an expert on a subject,
appealing to that person's judgment as a basis for deciding an issue
commits the fallacy of argumentum ad verecundiam-an improper ap-
peal to authority.67 This is true no matter how well known or well
reputed the person may be. Unless a person is an authority on the
particular issue, the person's opinion should not influence the
dispute.
While improper appeals to authority may seem too transparent to
65. Michael Isikoff, NRA Leaders Vow All-Out Fight Against 'Brady Bill,' WASH. POST, Apr.
14, 1991, at A12.
66. See Desda Moss, New NRA Chief Aims at Diversity, Laws Limiting Guns, USA TODAY, Apr.
17, 1991, at 2A (quoting newly elected NRA president Wayne LaPierre as stating that "the
NRA's about as mainstream and apple pie as you can get").
67. For a discussion of improper appeals to authority, see BENTHAM, supra note 5, at 25-
29 (explaining circumstances under which appeals to authority are fallacious); Copv, supra
note 5, at 61-62 (categorizing appeals either as inside or outside experts' field of specializa-
tion); DAMER, supra note 6, at 93-94 (discussing improper appeals to unidentified and biased
authorities and to non-authorities); FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 5, at 84-89 (explaining
use and misuse of authority); HAMBLIN, supra note 5, at 42-43 (providing historical overview
of use of improper appeals to authority).
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be beguiling, we nevertheless succumb to this fallacy every day.
Otherwise, companies would not pay millions of dollars to popular
entertainment personalities to secure testimonials for their prod-
ucts. If pop star MichaelJackson drinks Pepsi, it must be better than
Coke. Comedian Jay Leno likes Doritos, so throw out the potato
chips. Since athlete Bo Jackson wears Nike athletic shoes, they must
be superior to those of major competitor Reebok (unless one hap-
pens to think more highly of the athletes who endorse Reebok than
of Bo Jackson).
Perhaps the single most important factor influencing the passage
of the Brady bill was Ronald Reagan's endorsement of the legisla-
tion.68 Mr. Reagan had been a lifetime member of the NRA and was
the first candidate for President ever endorsed by that organiza-
tion.69 When the former President said in "clear, unmistakable lan-
guage" that he supported the Brady bill, 70 he deprived gun
enthusiasts of one of their most effective and time-honored rhetori-
cal weapons and handed an equally formidable one to the other
side.71 Haunted by the ghost of Willie Horton, Brady bill support-
ers, most of whom were Democrats, had to be wary of being por-
trayed as more concerned about gun control than about crime
control.72 But with Ronald Reagan on their side, no longer could it
68. SeeJohn A. Farrel, Senate OK's 5-Day Wait for Hand Gun Purchases, BOSTON GLOBE,June
29, 1991, at bl (stating that turning point in campaign for legislation was Reagan
endorsement).
69. See Chuck Conconi, WASH. PosT, June 23, 1988, at B3 (reporting that Reagan, life-
time NRA member, is believed to be first candidate for President ever to be endorsed by
NRA).
70. Ronald Reagan, Address at George Washington University Marking 10th Anniver-
sary of Attempt on His Life (Mar. 28, 1991). Mr. Reagan also said that waiting periods to
perform background checks are 'just plain common sense." Mr. Reagan on the Brady Bill,
WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1991, at A20 (reporting Reagan's unqualified endorsement of seven-
day waiting period for handgun purchases). This may explain the popularity of that phrase
among members of Congress who supported the Brady bill. See infra note 112 (documenting
appeals to "common sense" in Brady debate).
71. Support the Brady BilL' Congress Should Follow Reagan on Gun Control, SEAIxrr TmEs,
Mar. 31, 1991, at A18 (noting that Reagan's reversal in position undoubtedly surprised gun
enthusiasts because he had continued to oppose gun control for long period even after being
shot byJohn Hinckley). Reagan's steadfastness on the issue of gun control made him a hero
among gun lovers, as evidenced by the following tribute that appeared in a gun enthusiasts'
magazine after the Hinckley attack: "Thank God for President Reagan, a man who, even after
being shot, realizes that more gun controls are not the solution to our crime problem....
Here's a man of guts, common sense and vision. May he live to be 120." .JERvIs ANDERSON,
GUNS IN AMERICAN LIa 7 (1984) (quoting from the gun magazine Pistolero).
72. See Edward Walsh, Clinton Charges Bush Uses Crime Issue to Divide, WASH. PosT, July 24,
1992, at A16 (explaining that Willie Horton is convicted murderer who escaped from prison
in Massachusetts during prison furlough program). Horton later raped a woman. Id. The
Republicans used Horton's story in repeated negative advertisements during the 1988 presi-
dential campaign to portray the Democratic presidential candidate Michael Dukakis, then-
governor of Massachusetts, as being weak on law enforcement issues. Howard Kurtz, Past
Brings Perspective to Negative Ads, WASH. POST, July 28, 1992, at A8.
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be said that only "liberals" favored gun control. 73
The pro-Brady bill forces did not hesitate to capitalize on Ronald
Reagan's support, as well as on that of former Presidents Nixon,
Carter, and Ford.74 It is astonishing, however, that Mr. Reagan's
opinion on the issue should carry so much weight. Mr. Reagan is
not an expert on gun control. He is not a criminologist or constitu-
tional law scholar. He is simply a popular former President. It is
doubtful that he rigorously studied any of the literature on the sub-
ject of gun control or the Second Amendment in reaching his con-
clusion to support the Brady bill. With due respect to Mr. Reagan,
his opinion on the bill should carry about as much weight with the
public as a popular entertainer's endorsement of a consumer prod-
uct. Appealing to his judgment as a basis for deciding the issue was
an improper appeal to authority.75
To further strengthen their shield against criticism that they are
soft on crime, Brady bill supporters made good use of the fact that
most major national police organizations endorsed the legislation.7 6
This enabled them to project themselves as standing shoulder to
shoulder with the nation's police officers in the war against violent
street crime. 77 Appealing to the judgment of law enforcement as-
sociations on the issue was not completely fallacious because police
officers have substantial experience in dealing with guns and gun
73. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (citing examples of characterization of
gun control proponents as liberals).
74. See 137 CONG. REC. H2847 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Atkins) (an-
nouncing that he is proud to support legislation that is also backed by former Presidents
Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford, and Richard Nixon); id. at H2844 (statement of
Rep. Roemer) (noting that Brady bill had support of former Presidents Reagan and Nixon).
75. An opponent of the bill sought to explain away Mr. Reagan's support as "an act of
love and loyalty" to his friends, Sarah and Jim Brady, which it may have been. IL at H2824
(statement of Rep. Gekas).
76. Handgun Control, Inc. circulated a newsletter touting the support of the following
police organizations: Fraternal Order of Police, with 217,000 members; National Association
of Police Organizations, with 130,000 members; International Association of Chiefs of Police,
with 15,000 members; National Sheriffs' Association, with 22,000 members; and the National
Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, with 2,300 members. HANDGUN CON-
TROL, INC., POLICY LOBBY FOR NATIONAL WAITING PERIOD, JUST THE FAcrs ABOUT THE BRADY
BILL.
77. See 137 CONG. REC. H2837 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hughes) ("I
happen to be with police of this country and Sarah and Jim Brady."); id at H2837 (statement
of Rep. Gephardt) ("I will vote for the Brady bill because it has the strong support of the men
and women who wear the uniform, walk the beats, bust the pushers, and put their lives on the
line every day."). Representative Hughes followed his effort to identify himself with the
"good guys" by connecting opponents of the bill with the "bad guys." "Who is on the other
side of the issue?" he asked. "Make no mistake about it. The NRA is on the other side of the
issue." Id. at H2861 (statement of Rep. Hughes). Jeremy Bentham labeled this type of argu-
ment the fallacy of vituperative personalities. BEzrH.m, supra note 5, at 83-92. This fallacy
consists of arguing for the rejection of a measure based on the allegedly bad character of
those who favor it. Id- at 83-92. The fallacy is one form of ad hominem. For a discussion of ad
hominem, see infra notes 82-116 and accompanying text.
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violence. However, as American Civil Liberties Union Attorney
David B. Kopel noted, to the extent the Brady bill raises constitu-
tional issues regarding the proper interpretation of the Second
Amendment, deference to police opinion is inappropriate. 78 The
police, he reminded, are not noted for their dedication to protecting
individual liberties. 79 On this point he is correct that unqualified
deference to police organizations' judgment is unwarranted.
With Ronald Reagan, the police, and other stalwarts on their
side,80 the pro-Brady bill forces simply (if the pun can be forgiven)
outgunned the NRA in the contest for popular support. Lacking the
endorsements of presidents and major police organizations, Brady
bill opponents were reduced to trumpeting such generic good will
associations as "we have NRA members that are policemen, minis-
ters, doctors, lawyers, scout leaders, little league coaches[, and so
on.]" 81
4. Ad hominem
Whatever either side lacked in positive emotional identifications
between issues and personalities was made up for with negative con-
nections. A time-honored rule of effective persuasion is that it may
be more profitable to attack the arguer than it is to attack the argu-
ment.8 2 This is the fallacy of argumentum ad hominem, or "argument
directed against the man."83 Few fallacies are more potent or more
often employed.
Ad hominem works because of the emotional transference that oc-
curs from listeners' feelings about a speaker to their feelings about
78. Kopel, supra note 56, at S9048.
79. Kopel, supra note 56, at S9048. Kopel explained his position as follows:
The opinion of police chiefs is not the arbiter of our Constitutional rights. Some
police executives criticize the exclusionary rule; they claim that a strong Fourth
Amendment causes crime. Some police executives criticize the Miranda decision, and
claim that a strong Fifth Amendment causes crime. Many police executives say that a
strong Second Amendment causes crime. In every case the executives are wrong.
Id.
80. The American Medical Association (AMA) also endorsed the Brady bill. See 137
CONG. REC. H2824 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hoagland) ("The Nation's
doctors urge us to help them in a vital mission-saving lives. The AMA asks that we act swiftly
to put in place a measure to keep guns out of the hands of those who should not have them.").
The AMA, though certainly a distinguished body, is a questionable source of authority regard-
ing the wisdom of waiting periods and background checks, however.
81. Idl at H2830 (statement of Rep. Solomon).
82. The classic tale, presumably apocryphal, involves an English banister who had ne-
glected to prepare for trial, counting instead on a solicitor to investigate and prepare the case.
When the barrister arrived on the morning of trial, the solicitor handed him the trial brief.
Surprised by its thinness, the barrister opened it and found only a note reading: "No case;
abuse the plaintiff's attorney." Copi, supra note 5, at 60.
83. See Copi, supra note 5, at 54 (discussing and defining ad hominem fallacies).
[Vol. 42:53
1992] THE RHETORIC OF GUN CONTROL
his or her argument.8 4 If an audience has a negative opinion about
the speaker, that opinion is likely to carry over to the speaker's argu-
ment. For example, if one wanted to rebut Senator Edward Ken-
nedy's support for gun control with an ad hominem attack, the
argument might be: "I wonder if Senator Kennedy took any time
out from his drinking and carousing to study this issue."85 By gen-
erating negative emotions about the Senator, the speaker might also
convince the audience to discount the Senator's views concerning
gun control. The fallacy is that however distasteful Senator Ken-
nedy's personal character and lifestyle might be to some, these fac-
tors are logically irrelevant to the soundness of his judgment about
gun control.
Ad hominem comes in two basic forms.8 6 The first form, abusive ad
hominem, involves a direct attack on the speaker.8 7 The attack may
relate to the speaker's character, judgment, intelligence, or even the
person's inability to dress properly.88 The hypothetical involving
Senator Kennedy is an example of abusive ad hominem. The second
form of the ad hominem fallacy is circumstantial ad hominem, which
84. See Copi, supra note 5, at 55 (analyzing effectiveness of ad hominem on audience).
85. In fact, Senator Kennedy has frequently been the target ofjust this kind ofadhoninem
attack. For example, after Kennedy lambasted David Duke's candidacy for the governorship
of Louisiana, the former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan lashed back by saying, "I'd rather
be an ex-Klansman than the hero of Chappaquiddick. I'm very proud that Teddy Kennedy is
attacking me. It must mean that I'm doing something well." Ron Ridenhour, Duke Foes Join in
Uneasy Coalition, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 27, 1991, at A6, A7.
86. See DAMER, supra note 6, at 79-80 (discussing both types ofad hominemn arguments and
providing examples). Many other authors have analyzed ad hominem arguments and have often
classified the arguments in more than two categories. See BENTHAM, supra note 5, at 83-92
(classifying six groups of ad hominem attacks); STUART CHASE, GUIDES TO STRAIGHT THINKING:
WrrT THIRTEEN COMMON FALAcIEs 58-64 (1956) (identifying fallacies and discussing identifi-
cation scheme); CoPi, supra note 5, at 54-57 (discussing irrelevance of ad hominem attacks to
rational decisionmaking); FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 5, at 97-104 (analyzing four types
of ad hominem fallacies); HAMBUN, supra note 5, at 41-42 (giving historical overview of ad
hominem label).
87. DAMER, supra note 6, at 79.
88. See FISCHER, supra note 7, at 291 (illustrating abusive ad hominem attack with example
of closing argument used by Abraham Lincoln to destroy his opponent's esteem). Lincoln's
law partner, William H. Herndon, remembered the future President's argument in this way:
In a case where judge [Stephen T.] Logan-always earnest and grave-opposed him,
Lincoln created no little merriment by his reference to Logan's style of dress. He
carried the surprise in store for the latter, till he reached his turn before the jury.
Addressing them, he said: "Gentlemen, you must be careful and not permit your-
selves to be overcome by the eloquence of counsel for the defence. judge Logan, I
know, is an effective lawyer. I have met him too often to doubt that; but shrewd and
careful though he be, still he is sometimes wrong. Since this trial has begun I have
discovered that, with all his caution and fastidiousness, he hasn't knowledge enough
to put his shirt on right." Logan turned red as crimson, but sure enough, Lincoln
was correct, for the former had donned a new shirt, and by mistake had drawn it over
his head with the pleated bosom behind. The general laugh which followed de-
stroyed the effect of Logan's eloquence over the jury-the very point at which Lin-
coln had aimed.
Id (quoting WILLIAM H. HERNDON, HERNDON'S LIFE OF LINcoLN 291 (Paul Angle ed., 1965)).
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consists of disparaging a person's views based on some relationship
between those views and the person's special circumstances. 89 Both
varieties of this fallacy were in plentiful supply during the Brady bill
debate.9 0
The dominant theme of ad hominem attacks by the anti-gun control
movement has been to paint supporters of gun control as soft on
crime and as being more concerned with controlling guns than
criminals. One extreme example of this during the Brady bill con-
troversy was a song targeting gun control activists composed by the
leaders of an organization called Jews for the Preservation of Fire-
arms Ownership. 9l Sung to the tune of "America the Beautiful,"
the song, called "Ode to Felons," included these lyrics: "We are the
friends of felons, we want felons to be free; To murder, rape and sell
cocaine from L.A. to D.C."9 2
A less creative but equally mean-spirited way to attack advocates
of gun control was simply to invoke the dreaded "L" word.93 The
Brady bill debate was peppered with references to the "liberal polit-
ical conspiracy,"9 4 "ultra-liberal newspapers and congressmen, 9 5
the "liberals' anti-gun propaganda" 98 and-employing the most dis-
89. See FISCHER, supra note 7, at 81 (furnishing example of circumstantial ad hominem fal-
lacy wherein attorney's position on legal reform was attacked on basis of same person's occu-
pation as attorney).
90. See, e.g., Mitchell Locin, Texas Gunfire Changes I Vote, CHr. TRIB., Oct. 18, 1991, at MI
(quoting Representative Randy Cunningham in his abusive ad hominem attack on Representa-
tiveJohn Bryant, claiming that because Bryant did not serve in military or fight in combat, he
is not qualified to state that nobody needs assault weapons); Vivienne Walt, NRA Weapon
Against Gun Ban Grows Bigger, NEWSDAY, Feb. 24, 1991, at 13 (questioning reasoning and mo-
tives of representatives accepting donations from NRA by making circumstantial ad hominem
attacks); John Wellings, Gun Control Won't Help, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 27, 1991, at B3 (making
circumstantial ad hominem attack on Sarah Brady for supporting gun control because husband
was shot).
91. See Gun Lobby Plays at New Level of Hardball, States News Service,June 7, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File (reporting that Preservation of Firearms Ownership
organization distributed literature on Capitol Hill sharply criticizing "pro-criminal" Brady
bill).
92. Id. The Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership also purchased an adver-
tisement in a gun magazine in which the group called New York Representative Charles Schu-
mer a "stupid Jew" for supporting the Brady bill. Stephanie Saul, Schumer Defended on Gun
Stance, NEWSDAY, Apr. 30, 1991, at 15. The NRA disavowed any connection with the organiza-
tion. Id.
93. Cf BENTHAM, supra note 5, at 92 (attributing ready willingness with which people
resort to adhominem argumentation, of which calling someone "liberal" is example, to fact that
it requires "neither labor nor intellect").
94. See William D. Nveske, Letterline, USA TODAY, May 22, 1991, at 9A (reprinting letter
to editor characterizing Brady bill as first step in "liberal conspiracy" to totally disarm
populace).
95. See William A. Rossbach, Brady Gun Bill Passes in House, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 1991, at
B6 (denouncing efforts of conservative newspapers and legislators to criticize and classify
Brady bill as part of liberal agenda).
96. See Robert Hohl, Times Takes a Poke at the National Rifle Association, WASH. TIMES, May
13, 1991, at D2 (questioning objectivity of media in Brady bill debate).
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paraging slur possible in the war of liberal versus conservative poli-
tics-comparisons to Ted Kennedy.97
Some ad hominem arguments promoting this theme were more
subtle. In the House debate, one representative, without explana-
tion or elaboration, obliquely commented, "It is ... interesting to
note that a large number of supporters of the Brady bill oppose the
imposition of the death penalty and other 'get tough' measures with
criminals."9 8 Why was this "interesting"? For the same reason it
would be "curious." Used in this context, these terms are code
words of disparagement. The representative's statement was a
thinly veiled attempt to paint supporters of the Brady bill as liberals
who are soft on crime. 99
The campaign to brand all supporters of gun control as liberals
shares characteristics of both abusive and circumstantial ad
hominem. 100 It constitutes abusive ad hominem because in the wake of
the 1988 Republican presidential campaign, being labeled a "lib-
eral" had almost the same potency to malign as "commie" once
did.101 It is also circumstantial ad hominem because it is calculated to
effect rejection of speakers' opinions based solely on their special
circumstances, in this case, their political philosophies. The
message is, "Well, what do you expect her to say? She's a liberal."
The implication is that the speaker holds the opinion only because it
is consistent with liberal political philosophy and not because she
believes there are good reasons supporting it. To the extent that
being a liberal can be equated with being a Democrat, this is not
entirely fallacious as applied to members of Congress, because rep-
resentatives often do vote the party line.' 0 2 But in the context of the
97. See Saul, supra note 15, at 85 (describing NRA's use in negative campaign against gun
control advocates of Senator Edward Kennedy's reputation as advocate for liberal causes).
After Representative James Sensenbrenner, a Republican from Wisconsin, voted in favor of
the Brady bill in the HouseJudiciary Committee, the NRA sent a letter to his constituents that
included the comment, "Ha! With support like that, you might as well have Ted Kennedy
representing you." Id
98. 137 CONG. REC. H2852 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher).
99. Cf id at H2828 (statement of Rep. Inhofe) (pointing out in more direct attack on
Brady supporters that "if we look at the Members who are behind the Brady bill .... we find
Members who are opposed to the death penalty, Members opposed to the Violent Crime Act,
Members opposed in general to punishment for a deterrent to crime").
100. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text (defining types of ad hominem fallacies).
101. "Commies" have not been completely forgotten. See Wally's Right About Brady Bill,
ARK. DEMOCRAT, June 10, 1991, at 7B (stating in letter to editor that "[t]hose commies that
instigated high crime by bringing in probation, plea bargaining, early releases and weekend
passes are now trying to disarm the law-abiding citizens at a time when they can't even control
the criminals").
102. See generally ROGER H. DAvIDsON & WALTERJ. OLLESEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS
346 (3d ed. 1990) (noting high incidence of party unity votes in Congress). The authors state
that between 1970 and 1988, "the average legislator vote[d] with his or her party two-thirds
to four-fifths of the time." Id.
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overall debate, it is certainly a fallacy to imply that a person supports
gun control only because he or she is a "liberal."103
Another ad hominem theme of the anti-Brady bill forces was
dictatorialism. Brady bill supporters were cast as "anti-Second
Amendment"10 4 and "power-hungry"10 5 individuals for their per-
ceived indifference to the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms. A popular gun magazine published a list of "America's
Top Ten, 'Gun Grabbers,'" which charged Brady-sponsor Edward
Feighan, a Democratic representative from Ohio, with responsibility
for "more legislative efforts to take away your rights than nearly
anyone else in Congress."' 1 6 The magazine leveled a similar charge
against Ohio Senator Howard Metzenbaum, stating that he "can be
counted on to try to destroy as many of your Second Amendment
rights as he possibly can."'10 7
At its lowest point, the debate degenerated into ugly name-call-
ing. The anti-Brady bill side enhanced the nomenclature of gun
control with such affronts as "bullet-heads,"' 08 "gun-phobes,"' 10 9
"stupid Jew,"" 0 and "lily-livered bleeding hearts." 11' Brady bill
supporters were somewhat more subtle and restrained in their ad
hominem attacks. Rather than come right out and call their oppo-
nents idiots, the bill's supporters repeatedly extolled the "common
sense" of the legislation." 2 The implicit message was that oppo-
103. See Povich, supra note 55, at I (reporting that in final House of Representatives vote
on Brady bill, 60 Republican representatives who usually are considered "conservatives" cast
their support for gun control).
104. Alan M. Gottlieb, Brady Bill Assaults Our Rights, USA TODAY, May 7, 1991, at 10A
(enumerating criticisms of Brady bill supporters).
105. Id- (characterizing Brady bill as attempt by liberal politicians to encroach on citizens'
rights).
106. Larry Pratt, America's Top Ten "Gun Grabbers", GUNS AND AMmo, July 1991, at 97 (list-
ing names and activities of prominent gun control activists).
107. Idl at 25.
108. Gunningfor Control, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1991, at G2 (describing Brady bill as attack
on personal liberty).
109. Idl (referring to Brady bill supporters). The Washington Times denounced the Brady
bill as doing "absolutely nothing to curb violent crime and everything to harass and hamper
law-abiding citizens." l
110. See supra note 92 (discussing verbal attack on New York Representative Charles
Schumer).
111. Gun Control Bill Is Condemned, ARK. DEMOCRAT, June 6, 1991, at 1 B (proferring opin-
ion in letter to editor that gun control will lead to erosion of constitutional rights).
112. 137 CONG. REc. 58938 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Simon) ("We
have to have some common sense."); 137 CONG. REC. H2846 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (state-
ment of Rep. Panetta) ("These facts make obvious that waiting periods and background
checks make sense-perfect, clear, logical sense."); id, at H2844 (statement of Rep. Roemer)
("[The Brady bill] makes sense."); id. at H2836 (statement of Rep. Roukema) ("[Tlhe Brady
bill is a matter of simple common sense."); id at H2832 (statement ofRep. Schumer) ("(The
Brady bill is the very model of common sense."); id. at H2824 (statement of Rep. Levine)
("[W]hat we are about to do is put some common sense and reason into a policy that is
nonexistent."); Brady Bill Will Save Many Lives, USA TODAY, May 7, 1991, (Editorial), at IOA
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nents of the legislation lacked common sense. Rather than directly
accuse House members who supported a weaker, NRA-backed sub-
stitute bill 13 of being liars and hoodwinkers, representatives
attacked the substitute bill as a "blatant ruse,"' 14 a "sham,"' 15 and a
"smokescreen." 116
All of the fallacies discussed to this point encourage the listener to
substitute emotion for reason as the basis for deciding an issue.
The rhetorician attempts to manipulate us to form opinions about a
proposal based on fear or pity, 117 or because it is the popular or
patriotic thing to do," 8 or because we like and respect some other
person who has expressed an opinion about the proposal and who
has been presented to us as an authority on the subject, 119 or be-
cause we have negative feelings about a person who supports or op-
poses the proposal.' 20 But these appeals divert us from focusing on
the wisdom of the proposal, which is the only real issue. Whether a
proposal is wise can only be determined after a reasoned analysis of
("If Congress can muster a little courage and common sense, it can save hundreds of lives that
otherwise will be lost to gunfire."); Charles Schumer, The Brady Bill's Right on Target, NEWSDAY,
May 6, 1991, at 36 ("It seems that such a simple, common sense proposal should be easily
approved.").
113. H.R. 1412, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), 137 CONG. REC. H2855-56 (daily ed. May 8,
1991). This was the so-called Staggers bill, named after its sponsor, Representative Harley
Staggers of West Virginia. The bill called for the creation of an instant point of sale check
system that would immediately identify felons who attempted to purchase handguns. Id. An
effective instantaneous screening system would eliminate the need for a waiting period, but
unfortunately, the Office of Technology Assessment estimated that development of such a
system would require five to ten years and hundreds of millions of dollars. 137 CONG. REC.
58935 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum). As a result, the House
rejected the Staggers proposal. 137 CONG. REC. H2876 (daily ed. May 8, 1991). The Senate
rejected a similar proposal sponsored by Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska. 137 CONG. REC.
S8946 (daily ed. June 27, 1991). The version of the Brady bill ultimately adopted by the
Senate and subsequently by House and Senate conferees approved both a waiting period and
the establishment of an instant check system. See supra note 3 (discussing history of Brady
bill). Under the Brady bill, the federally mandated waiting period will be phased out after the
instant check system is certified as operational. H.R. 7, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1241,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2701-2703 (1991).
114. 137 CONG. REC. H2837 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Roukema) (ques-
tioning feasibility of Staggers bill). Representative Roukema, a supporter of the Brady bill,
also referred to the Staggers bill as "an obvious ploy to provide political cover for Members
who want to look as though they are voting for handgun control but are actually killing it for
years to come." Id.
115. See id, at H2841 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) ("The Staggers bill is a sham. It
is so riddled with exemptions that it really is not effective.").
116. See id. at H2847 (statement of Rep. Panetta) (questioning whether handgun and mur-
der statistics are needed to demonstrate superiority of Brady bill over Staggers bill).
117. See FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 5, at 128-29 (discussing how fear of one alter-
native can lead to support for another).
118. See FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 5, at 92 (noting fallacies contained in appeals
to "get on the bandwagon").
119. See FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 5, at 84 (discussing effect on reasoning process
of appeals by reliable or knowledgeable personalities).
120. See FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 5, at 92 (asserting that association of idea with
unpopular figure results in rejection of idea).
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relevant factors is undertaken, such as whether the proposal's goal
will be beneficial to society, whether it will be possible to implement
as a practical and legal matter, whether, if enacted, it will achieve its
intended goal, and what the cost of implementation will be.
The cost of implementation includes not only the economic but
also the human cost. In considering this factor, it is important to
distinguish illicit appeals to emotion from legitimate appeals to hu-
manistic values and moral judgments,12 1 because the latter are vital
components of the "logic" of public decisionmaking. Most law re-
form proposals will have consequences that affect the lives of real
people. Decisions as to which consequences society wants to en-
courage, and which it prefers to avoid, necessarily depend on value
preferences.
Thus, belief in the sanctity of human life and compassion for vic-
tims of crime make it proper to consider whether a waiting period
for handguns will save more innocent lives than it will cost. Simi-
larly, the interest in individual freedom to act makes it appropriate
to consider whether a waiting period is an onerous burden on that
freedom or only a minor inconvenience. In these examples, com-
passion and liberty are appealed to not as disconnected emotional
symbols to incite adoption or rejection of the Brady bill, but as part
of a reasoned inquiry concerning the consequences of the legisla-
tion. Will the legislation promote or inhibit desirable or undesir-
able values? In contrast, the fallacies discussed in this section are
not designed to facilitate cognitive consideration of values. Instead
they are intended to stimulate an affective state of consciousness
that will preempt cognitive consideration of the issues.
B. Fallacies of Diversion
The fallacies of emotion discussed in the preceding section are
diversionary in that they are intended to shift attention away from
honest and valid reasoning about the merits of a proposal. How-
ever, because these fallacies all accomplish this by the same means,
by appeals to raw emotion, they warranted treatment as a separate
category. Emotion is the strongest bond tying them together.
The fallacies evaluated in this section are less well-connected.
They are diversionary, but unlike the fallacies of emotion, they do
not achieve diversion by appealing to some more powerful force. In
other words, they do not operate by forsaking reason in favor of
121. See DAMER, supra note 6, at 89 (making point that appeal to pity, which would nor-
mally be fallacious, would not be fallacious if purpose was to draw attention to moral
principle).
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some other basis for making a decision. Instead, the fallacies in this
section operate by distorting the reasoning process in ways intended
to make the audience lose track of or ignore the real point.' 22 This
is accomplished through overstatement and understatement, by
making irrelevant connections between premises and conclusions,
and by drawing irrelevant analogies.' 23
1. Hyperbole
One of the most elementary fallacies of diversion is hyperbole.
Hyperbole is an exaggeration for rhetorical effect.' 24 To the extent
hyperbole is used only to add ornament or flourish to speech, it is
not objectionable and may even contribute positively to discourse.
The world would be a drab place if we demanded that all discussion
of public issues be couched in dispassionate and colorless terms.
Imagery, euphony, adornment, and metaphor breathe life into lan-
guage. When the issue is vital and the consequences of a decision
are great, it may be necessary to speak bluntly and even stridently.
In such cases, false euphemism would only detract from clear
thinking.' 25
Nevertheless, audiences need to be wary of sophists who use hy-
perbole to overstate the clarity and certainty of their positions. By
representing a matter as indisputable, a speaker may convince an
audience that it is not necessary to think about a problem or may
forestall disagreement from those who do think about it.1 26 Lawyers
and judges are experts at accomplishing this by using a single word
or phrase, such as "clearly," "plainly," "obviously," "absolutely,"
"completely," or "it is axiomatic."' 127
122. See FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 5, at 121 (examining use of diversionary
fallacies).
123. See id. (explaining diversionary methods and providing examples).
124. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIoNARY 1112 (3d ed. 1981).
125. See FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 5, at 80 (advocating frankness as means of
serving truth).
126. See FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 5, at 101 (referring to fallacy of "Forestalling
Disagreement" as means to prevent debate).
127. In a passage directed at historians but applicable to everyone, David Fischer ex-
plained why all such assurances should be evaluated with skepticism:
Historians have been known to write "always" for "sometimes," and "sometimes"
for "occasionally," and "occasionally" for "rarely," and "rarely," for "once."
... "[C]ertainly" sometimes means "probably," and "probably" means "possibly,"
and "possibly" means "conceivably." Similarly the phrase "It needs no comment"
should sometimes be translated as "I do not know what comment it needs." When a
historian writes, "It is unknown," he might mean "It is unknown to me," or "I don't
know," or even "I won't tell." The expression "in fact" sometimes means merely "in
my opinion." And the phrases "doubtless" or "undoubtedly," or "beyond a shadow
of a doubt" sometimes really should be read, "An element of doubt exists which I,
the author, shall disregard."
FISCHER, supra note 7, at 270-71.
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One of the most prominent issues in the Brady bill debate was
whether the legislation would accomplish what it was intended to
accomplish; that is, whether waiting periods and background checks
would really prevent criminals from obtaining guns. Opponents of
the measure asserted that the legislation would not do this and
sought to bury any doubts about the question under an avalanche of
hyperbole. They made bold assertions that the law "would have ab-
solutely no effect upon criminals," 1 28 "will do absolutely nothing to
curb violent crime," 129 "would do nothing to prevent criminals
from obtaining guns,"' 30 "will not prevent a single criminal who
wants a handgun from getting one,"' 31 and "would do nothing to
curb the incidence of crime and violence on America's streets. ' 132
"Predicting," some wise person once said, "is a risky venture, espe-
cially with regard to the future." The truth is that no one knows
what effect the Brady bill will have on gun violence. Each of the
claims listed above is fallacious because it represents a matter as cer-
tain when in fact the matter is largely speculative.' 33 This observa-
tion would be true even if the predictions proved to be accurate. In
128. Rossbach, supra note 95, at B6 (advocating presidential veto of Brady bill).
129. Gunning For Control, supra note 108, at G2.
130. 137 CONG. REC. H2852 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher).
131. Id. at H2863 (statement of Rep. Hancock).
132. 137 CONG. REC. S8936 (daily ed.June 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Symms). Strong
hyperbole of this type also commits the fallacy of ipse dixit, which translates to "[he] himself
said it." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 743 (5th ed. 1979). An ipse dixit fallacy i3 an assertion made
with no proof or authority to support it. These fallacies are difficult to address effectively in
argument because while they can be disputed, they are difficult to refute, particularly if they
relate to evaluative matters.
133. For example, proponents of the Brady bill countered the anti-Brady bill hyperbolic
arguments exemplified in the text accompanying notes 128-32, supra, by promulgating their
own hyperbole, claiming that the law would save hundreds and even thousands of lives. See
137 CONG. REC. H2834 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Sangmeister) ("The answer
is we save lives-potentially, thousands of lives."); Brady Bill Will Save Many Lives, supra note
112, at 10A ("If Congress can muster a little courage and common sense, it can save hundreds
of lives that otherwise would be lost to gunfire.").
Related to this kind of hyperbole is a fallacy that Madsen Pirie calls "Every Schoolboy
Knows." PIRIE, supra note 5, at 62-65. This fallacy is committed when the speaker overstates
the obviousness of a particular point to shame the opposition into accepting it. See id. at 62
(suggesting that labeling concept as universally accepted results in acceptance without de-
bate). For example, if a speaker stated, "Even a child knows that criminals do not buy their
guns from gun shops," the opponent might be reluctant to disagree out of the shame and fear
of appearing to know less than a mere child.
Brady bill partisans used such fallacies in subtle and effective ways by repeatedly hammer-
ing the message that the Brady bill was a matter of plain common sense. See supra note 112
(documenting use of appeal to common sense as rallying cry by Brady bill supporters). Oppo-
nents could voice disagreement only at the risk of appearing to lack common sense. A more
extreme example of the fallacy occurred when a pro-Brady bill representative challenged his
colleagues with the question, "Who in the world, in this body or in this country, can argue
with the fact that we should have a waiting period of 7 days, to find out if someone has been in
a mental institution, or if someone has a criminal record, before we sell them a handgun?"
137 CONG. REC. H2840 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Derrick). The implied,
unstated answer to the question was "only a fool."
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other words, the fact that a speculative prediction turns out to be
true does not change the fallacious nature of the prediction at the
time it was made.
The converse of using hyperbole to overstate a position is em-
ploying deprecatory hyperbole to understate it. As overstatement is
used to bolster a speaker's position, deprecatory hyperbole is used
to minimize the weight of competing evidence or arguments. Dep-
recatory hyperbole consists of such words as "merely," "simply," or
''only."
The most notable illustration of this fallacy in the Brady bill de-
bate involved the same issue discussed above: whether the law
would prevent convicted felons from obtaining guns. The Brady bill
would apply only to handgun purchases from licensed firearms deal-
ers.134 Thus, the evidence most relevant to predicting the impact of
the law comes from studies showing the percentage of convicted
felons who obtain handguns from conventional retail outlets.
Figures cited in the gun control debate on this point ranged from
twelve to thirty percent. 35 Brady bill backers viewed these statistics
as providing support for the legislation. 36 Opponents of the bill,
however, minimized the significance of the numbers by framing
them in deprecatory hyperbole. A Senator argued that of all the
guns acquired by criminals, "only about 12 percent... came from
stores."13 7 Similarly, a newspaper editorial stated that "only one-
sixth [of convicted felons] obtained their weapons in a retail transac-
tion." 138 And a criminologist emphasized that a Florida study
showed "only thirty percent of handgun murderers and assaulters
reported acquiring their guns from dealers."' 39
134. Both the House and Senate versions of the bill applied only to licensed importers,
manufacturers, and dealers of firearms. H.R. 7, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(s)(1) (1991); S.
1241, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 2701(a)(u)(1) (1991).
135. See, e.g., JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. Rossi, ARMED AND DANGEROUS, A SURVEY OF
FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 4-7 (1986) (exploring relationship between convicted felons, use
of firearms, and incidence of violent crime by examining survey data collected from nearly
2,000 convicted felons incarcerated in state prisons around country). Responding to a ques-
tion in the Wright/Rossi survey as to how they obtained handguns, only 16% of convicted
felons who acknowledged having owned a handgun said they purchased their most recent
handgun from a conventional retail source. WRIGHT & Rossl, supra, at 185.
136. See 137 CONG. REC. H2846 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Panetta) ("I
feel it is highly important to point out that statistics have shown that around one in six
criminals who have committed crimes with handguns bought their weapons from a licensed
dealer."); Norm Brewer, Gun Law Debate Hangs on Stories, Not on Statistics, USA TODAY, Apr. 17,
1991, at 1 (quoting spokesperson for Handgun Control, Inc. as stating that avoidance of
handgun sales to one in six convicted felons is "very important").
137. 137 CONG. REC. S8937 (daily ed.June 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Gramm) (empha-
sis added).
138. Gunning For Control, supra note 108, at G2 (emphasis added) (citing United States
Department ofJustice study of 1800 felons).
139. Gary Kleck, Policy Lessons from the Recent Gun Control Research, 49 Lw & CONTEMP.
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It is entirely possible, of course, that these were not intentional
attempts to fallaciously depreciate the statistics, but instead were
honest value judgments regarding the benefits of the Brady bill as
measured against its costs. In either case, the effect was the same.
Use of the word "only" worked to understate the magnitude of the
numbers. When the percentages are converted to absolute num-
bers, they seem to favor the pro-Brady bill side. Accepting that
"only" twelve to thirty percent of convicted felons purchase their
handguns over the counter means that from 12,000 to 30,000 of
every 100,000 handguns acquired by convicted felons would be cov-
ered by the Brady bill. 140 Regardless of the speakers' intent, the
attempt to minimize these numbers by use of the word "only" con-
stituted fallacious deprecatory hyperbole.
2. The slippery slope
A specialized application of hyperbole with great relevance to gun
control consists of attacking a proposal by raising the spectre of ter-
rible results that will follow if the proposal is adopted. In classical
terminology, this is the "slippery slope" argument."" In this type
of argument, any restriction, no matter how harmless in itself, is
PROBS. 35, 55 (1986). Professor Kleck discussed gun policy generally in his article and not the
Brady bill specifically. In the article, he employed deprecatory hyperbole to minimize other
statistics relevant to gun control. For example, he recited that "in 1979 only about nine per-
cent of rape offenders were armed with a gun" and stated that "[t]he presence of a gun in even
these few rapes was often incidental and not necessary in the commission of the crime .... Id.
at 39 (emphasis added). In 1979, there were 76,390 reported rapes. BUaU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 173 (1990). If we
accept Kleck's percentage estimate as correct, that means 6875 rapists were armed with guns
in 1979. It is questionable whether the use of modifiers such as "only" or "these few rapes" is
appropriate in describing this figure.
Some Brady antagonists characterized the statistics regarding over-the-counter handguns
purchased by convicted felons in terms that could be regarded as transgressing beyond hyper-
bole to outright falsehood. See 137 CONG. REC. S8933 (daily ed.June 27, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Stevens) (insisting that "[v]irtually no felon" buys firearms from retail stores); 137 CONG.
REC. H2874 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Geren) (asserting that Wright and
Rossi study "prove[s] that felons simply do not get guns from legitimate sources"); id. at
H2863 (statement of Rep. Hancock) (arguing that criminals "almost always" obtain their
weapons by means 6ther than purchases from retail dealers).
Brady defenders directed their deprecatory hyperbole against the waiting period, describ-
ing it as "only" a "minor" or "mere" inconvenience. See id. at H2851 (statement of Rep.
Collins) ("What is wrong with this country that we place a mere 7-day wait for a weapon above
the lives of our citizens?"); id. at H2845 (statement of Rep. Downey) ("[The waiting period]
asks only that [gun purchasers] endure a minor inconvenience for the sake of saving lives.").
140. Cf 137 CONG. REC. H2850 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Ackerman)
(citing Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) study assessing feasibility of instant back-
ground checks before gun sales that estimates that convicted criminals purchase at least
50,000 firearms each year from gun stores).
141. See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 361-62 (1985) (defining
slippery slope as argumentative claim "that a particular act, seemingly innocuous when taken
in isolation, may yet lead to a future host of similar but increasingly pernicious events").
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subject to being assailed as "[t]he camel's nose ... in the tent."' 142
Because the strategy has nothing to do with the reasonableness of a
particular gun control measure under consideration, it is always
available.
So it was in the contest over the Brady bill. In the end, the crux of
the dispute over the legislation was the provision establishing a
waiting period to purchase a handgun.' 43 While some Brady bill
opponents attacked waiting periods as onerous burdens on law-
abiding gun purchasers, 144 they did not succeed in generating much
public outrage in this regard. A 1991 Gallup poll showed that
eighty-seven percent of the American people favored a national
waiting period for handgun purchases.' 45
Perhaps in recognition of this popular support for waiting peri-
ods, many Brady bill adversaries resorted to the slippery slope strat-
egy. Under this approach, waiting periods were no longer the issue.
Instead, members of Congress were told that they were voting on
"just the beginning of a flood of restrictions,"' 146 "the first step to-
ward eliminating our second amendment rights,"' 47 "the first step
in the total disarmament of the American populace,"'148 and "the
ugly foot in the door."'149 These slippery slope arguments diverted
the focus of the debate away from the merits of waiting periods by
drawing noisy attention to other, more severe restrictions that were
not actually at issue.
Was this fallacious? The consequences of a proposal are certainly
relevant to deciding whether to adopt it. One potential conse-
quence of imposing a reasonable restriction on a constitutional right
is that it may represent the proverbial "first step" toward the next
142. lId at 361 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 402 (1973) (Stewart,J., dissenting)).
143. See Povich, supra note 55, at 1 (describing NRA's eleventh hour attempt to avoid
federally mandated waiting period for handguns by throwing its support behind computerized
check system contained in Staggers bill to perform instantaneous background checks on
handgun purchasers); see also supra note 113 (explaining provisions of Staggers bill).
144. See 137 CONG. REC. S8940 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("I
hope most of us will stand up and vote for our right to keep and bear arms and for not having
these onerous provisions.").
145. See Alex Prud'homme, A Blow to the N.R.A.; The House Takes an Overdue Stand for Gun
Control, TIME, May 20, 1991, at 26 (citing increasing support for gun control legislation).
146. 137 CONG. REC. S8934 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Stevens).
147. Id at S8937 (statement of Sen. Murkowski) (arguing against passage of Brady bill).
148. Nveske, supra note 94, at 9A (printing letter to editor remarking that "[gluns made us
free and guns will keep us free").
149. Isikof, supra note 65, at A12 (quoting NRA member); see also Gun Down the Brady Bill,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1991, at G2 ("Some analysts say the bill is a sneaky little effort to get
complete control of handguns."); Saul, supra note 15, at 19 (quoting aide to Representative
Harley Staggers as stating, "The Brady bill is the first step in whittling away... [the right to
bear arms].").
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restriction, which may be an unreasonable one. However, this con-
cern is valid only if relevant empirical facts establish some real likeli-
hood that the next step will in fact be taken.' 50 To the extent an
argument raises exaggerated fears of an uncontrolled tumble down
the slippery slope, with no evidence realistically supporting those
fears, it is fallacious. It crosses the line from a legitimate concern
about a proposal's consequences to something that has been re-
ferred to as the fallacy of the "unnecessary parade of horribles."' 5 '
The question of where to draw the line on the slippery slope is a
problem in virtually all decisionmaking.' 52 Usually, there is no clear
point demarcating where the line should be drawn. Nevertheless,
public decisionmakers must draw lines somewhere, even if the lines
are arbitrary, or they abdicate their decisionmaking responsibility.
When individual rights are implicated, line placement is determined
by balancing the rights of individuals against the interests of the
community. No right emerges from this process absolute.
Nor should it. There is no right to disseminate child pornogra-
phy, to yell "Fire!" in a crowded theater, or to libel a person, even
though the First Amendment provides that "no law" shall be made
abridging free speech.' 53 Similarly, while we enjoy complete free-
dom of belief with regard to religious practices, the First Amend-
ment does not always protect the right to act on those beliefs.' 5 4
The Fourth Amendment is subject to an interpretation that all
searches require warrants issued pursuant to probable cause, but
the Supreme Court continues to expand the situations in which war-
rantless searches are permitted.' 5 5 And the Sixth Amendment pro-
150. See Schauer, supra note 141, at 381 (discussing proper context for examining slippery
slope arguments).
151. SCHLAG & SKOVER, supra note 22, at 31-32 (referring to rhetorical technique of sug-
gesting dire consequences that are neither relevant nor likely to occur). Commentators have
also termed this approach "The Wicked Alternative." FEARNSIDE & HOLImER, supra note 5, at
128-29.
152. See Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 168 (1925) (Holmes, J.) (opining that "where to
draw the line... is the question in pretty much everything worth arguing in the law").
153. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-64 (1982) (denying First Amendment
protection for child pornography); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964)
(establishing First Amendment standards for libel actions against public officials); Schenk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (discussing limitations on First Amend-
ment freedoms).
154. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) ("Laws are made for the gov-
ernment of actions and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions,
they may with practices."). The Court upheld an Act of Congress prohibiting bigamy in the
territory of Utah. Id.
155. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 369 (1987) (approving warrantless search
of suspect's backpack found in vehicle as lawful inventory search); United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 823-25 (1982) (approving warrantless searches of containers in automobiles);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (approving full body search without
search warrant as lawful search incident to custodial arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
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vides for the assistance of counsel at trial, but criminal defendants
are not entitled to have the state pay for the counsel of their choice
in defense.' 5 6 The list could go on.
Most gun owners probably would agree with these restrictions on
individual liberties and with the general principle that individual
rights must yield at some point to the interests of the community.
Why is it, then, that proposed restrictions on guns are invariably
met with the argument: "If we let them do x today, they'll be com-
ing to take away our hunting rifles tomorrow?" Why are restrictions
on the Second Amendment viewed as different, as somehow more
diabolical and treacherous than restrictions on other rights? Is
there an empirical reality to the fear that a waiting period to
purchase a handgun is really just the first step toward the oblitera-
tion of the Second Amendment?
Although gun control advocates are reluctant to admit it, the evi-
dence suggests that gun aficionados have some cause to be nervous
about gun control measures like the Brady bill. To a large extent,
passing the Brady bill, as even some of its proponents conceded,
was more a symbolic victory over the NRA than the implementation
of an effective means of keeping criminals from getting guns. 157
And while many supporters of the measure took pains to pledge
their allegiance to the right to bear arms,' 58 others candidly sug-
gested that the Brady bill was, literally, the "first step" toward more
stringent controls on gun ownership. I59
(1968) (approving warrantless body frisks based on reasonable suspicion that suspect is
armed and dangerous).
156. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 810 n.5 (1975) (discussing denial of defendant's
motion for appointment of counsel from outside public defender's office).
157. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. H2824 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Traficant).
Representative Traficant, a pro-Brady bill partisan, stated that:
Mr. Speaker, neither the Brady bill, nor the substitute, will have much impact on
crime in America. My colleagues know it, and I know it. Today's debate is not about
gun laws or waiting periods. Today's debate is: Who in America will write the future
gun laws: the U.S. Congress or the National Rifle Association?
158. See, e.g., id. at H2843 (statement of Rep. Valentine) ("I am a gun owner and collector.
I have been a hunter. I may even be what some people refer to as a 'gun nut.' I firmly support
the right of law-abiding citizens to own and use firearms for lawful purposes."); id. (statement
of Rep. Carper) ("I rise in strong support of my right and privilege to keep and bear arms. I
hunted in northern Indiana as a young boy, and I hope someday my children have that same
right."); id. at H2841 (statement of Rep. Andrews) ("I have always opposed gun control [in
general]. As a prosecutor in Houston, as an avid hunter, I have always felt that gun control
laws tend to restrict and hurt lawful gun owners, as opposed to criminals.").
159. Perhaps the clearest statement to this effect came from Pete Shields, chairman emeri-
tus of Handgun Control, Inc., who made the following remarks in an interview:
We're going to have to take one step at a time, and the first step is necessarily-given
the political realities-going to be very modest .... So then we'll have to start
working again to strengthen that law, and then again to strengthen the next law, and
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There is no doubt that the agenda of many Brady bill proponents
encompasses much more than the adoption of waiting periods and
background checks. Many Brady bill supporters want to prohibit
private possession of handguns altogether. 160 This is what differen-
tiates the Second Amendment slippery slope argument from most
other arguments. Persons who believe in a civil remedy for libel are
not ultimately looking to abolish newspapers. People who opposed
polygamy in the 19th century did not want to outlaw the Mormon
church. Most people who advocate wider search and seizure author-
ity for the police do not want to do away with the Fourth Amend-
ment. But many of those who support waiting periods and
background checks for handgun purchases do want to completely
ban handguns.
That the prohibition of handguns is the goal of many gun control
advocates gives some credence to the slippery slope arguments ad-
vanced against the Brady bill, but not enough to make them non-
fallacious. Despite the yearnings of many champions of gun control,
guns are so deeply entrenched in this country's history and culture
that there is virtually no chance they ever will be banned. Guns are
inextricably identified with the frontier spirit that Americans ideal-
ize. 161 Even peaceful people idolize celluloid killers like Stallone,
Eastwood, Gibson, and, more recently, Seagal and Van Damme.
The very fact that the notion of having to wait a few days to buy a
maybe again and again. Our ultimate goal-total control of handguns in the United
States-is going to take time.
Pratt, supra note 106, at 24. Members of Congress echoed Mr. Shields' sentiment. See, e.g.,
137 CONG. REc. H2851 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Stokes) (affirming also that
Brady bill "is one step in the right direction"); id. at H2846 (statement of Rep. Serrano)
("mhe Brady bill is but a first step in our Nation's journey toward a society free of handgun
violence."); i at H2841 (statement of Rep. Hayes) (stating that bill "is one step in the right
direction"); id. at H2836 (statement of Rep. Mazzoli) (asserting that Brady bill "is one step in
that direction").
160. For example, the National Coalition to Ban Handguns advocates a total ban on hand-
guns. See James B.Jacobs, Exceptions to a General Prohibition on Handgun Possession: Do They Swal-
low Up the Rule, 49 LAw & CoNTEMp. PROBS. 5, 5 nA (1986) (quoting from National Coalition
to Ban Handguns pamphlet that supports banning of manufacture, sale, and private posses-
sion of handguns). One writer asserts that the abolition of handguns is also the true agenda
of Handgun Control, Inc. See Kopel, supra note 56, at S9054 (noting that "Handgun Control,
Inc.'s former chairman has stated that he favors intermediate control as a waystation to near-
total handgun prohibition").
161. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE CITIZEN's GUIDE TO GUN CON-
TROL 70 (1987) (discussing prevalence of guns in American society). Zimring and Hawkins
note that historian Richard Hofstadter attributes the American identification of guns with the
frontier as a nostalgic reference back to an era of less complexity and more rural existence.
lad Hofstadter notes "lilt is very easy in interpreting American history to give the credit and
the blame for almost everything to the frontier, and certainly this temptation is particularly
strong where guns are concerned." Id. Nevertheless, he adds, "when the frontier and its
ramifications are given their due, they fall far short of explaining the persistence of the Ameri-
can gun culture." Id
THE RHETORIC OF GUN CONTROL
handgun generated such intense controversy is itself a testament
that we are nowhere near the brink of a free-fall toward stringent
gun restrictions. While the extreme views of many gun control sup-
porters make the slippery slope argument understandable, asser-
tions that the Brady bill is "the first step in the total disarmament of
the American populace"1 62 remain hyperbolic exaggerations.
3. The straw man and the red herring
Two related fallacies of diversion that were well utilized during
the Brady bill controversy are the fallacies of the straw man and the
red herring. The straw man fallacy involves refuting an opponent's
position by mischaracterizing it. The argument that is then met is
not the real argument at all but only a "straw man" that can be eas-
ily knocked down. 163 One way to accomplish this is by exaggerating
the true argument to absurd lengths. For example, in the Brady bill
debate, a House member opposed to the measure mounted a pas-
sionate argument against the idea that "disarming everyone makes
people equal in strength."'1 The flaw in this argument is that sup-
porters of the Brady legislation were not arguing in favor of dis-
armament, but only in favor of waiting periods and background
checks for handgun purchases. Either unwilling or unable to deal
with these narrow issues on their merits, the representative chose to
build a more easily assailable straw man and knock it down instead.
His diatribe is reminiscent of the tale of the judge who, after listen-
ing patiently to a young lawyer's eloquent argument, told the law-
yer, "That's a fine argument, young man. Let us hope that someday
you find a case to which it applies."
Not to be outdone, the pro-Brady bill side of the debate offered
up this transparent straw man:
I leave you with this simple question that I have asked myself and
answered by supporting the Brady bill. Do you believe that it is a
constitutionally guaranteed right for any mentally incompetent
person, convicted felon, drug addict, or illegal alien to walk into a
gun store, fill out a form, sign their name, and walk out with a
handgun, with no questions even being asked by anyone? 165
162. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (quoting letter to editor printed in USA
Today).
163. See DAVID L. ALLEN &JANE C. PARKs, ESSENTIAL RHETORIC 111-12 (1969) (describing
characteristics of straw man attacks); DAMER, supra note 6, at 99 (labeling straw man argu-
ments as fallacy of "Distortion"); SCHLAG & SKOVER, supra note 22, at 22-23 (noting effective-
ness of dismantling argument through attack on straw man).
164. 137 CONG. REc. H2840 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Smith) (describing
circumstances where guns can make potential victims and criminals more equal in terms of
power).
165. Id. at H2859 (statement of Rep. Stenholm).
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Fortunately for the speaker, the question was framed as a rhetori-
cal one. Otherwise, he would have risked being hooted off the po-
dium by a unanimous and resounding, "Hell no!" No one, not even
the NRA, has ever suggested that convicted criminals and mental
patients have a constitutional right to buy handguns, with or without
questions asked. Everyone apparently agrees that these people
should be prohibited from purchasing handguns. The issue in the
Brady bill debate was whether waiting periods and background
checks are the appropriate means for accomplishing this. As in the
previous example, the speaker grossly distorted the real issue to
give himself an easier target to attack. 166
The distinction between the straw man and the red herring is sub-
tle. While the straw man diverts attention by unreasonably exagger-
ating an opponent's position, red herrings divert attention by
sending the audience chasing down the wrong trail after a non-is-
sue. 167 An example of this involves Ronald Reagan's endorsement
of the Brady bill. 168 Most Brady bill opponents simply opted not to
mention the former President because his position was a painful
thorn in their side. One brave soul was not deterred, however. In
an amazing exhibition of obfuscation, an anti-Brady bill representa-
tive managed to address Mr. Reagan's endorsement without con-
fronting it. He accomplished this by shifting the focus of the
argument from Mr. Reagan's endorsement to the way Democrats
had ridiculed the former President's views when he was in office, as
follows:
[T]he proponents of the Brady bill seize upon the Ronald Reagan
statements and the Ronald Reagan who has come to the support
166. Cf George Papajohn, NRA Takes a Shot at CHA Ban on Guns, CI. TRia., May 18, 1991,
at 1 (relating particularly flagrant straw man argument advanced in gun control dispute con-
cerning authority of Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) to ban firearms in residential commu-
nities operated by CHA). In response to a letter from the NRA questioning the
constitutionality of the ban, CHA Chairperson Vincent Lane said, "It's crazy for [the NRA] to
be a proponent of the continuing slaughter of young black males in these communities." Id.
Questioning the constitutionality of the housing authority restriction in no way equated to
being a proponent of murdering young African-American males. This argument was a flimsy
and quite irresponsible straw man.
167. The red herring fallacy is named after a trick used in fox hunting. When the dogs are
following the wrong scent during a fox hunt, a herring, cooked to a brownish-red color, is
dragged across the trail to shift the scent and, hence, the trail being followed. In rhetoric, the
trail is the argument and the red herring is an irrelevant issue used to draw attention away
from the real issue. See CORBETr, supra note 4, at 92 (discussing elements of red herring
diversion); DAMER, supra note 6, at 102-04 (describing use of red herring rhetorical ploy);
FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 5, at 124-25 (calling red herring fallacy "the patron saint of
those being overwhelmed in argument").
168. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (describing President Reagan's support
of both NRA and Brady bill).
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of the Brady bill as being the last word in support of their proposi-
tion that is embodied in the Brady bill.
Mr. Speaker, where were these individuals when Ronald Reagan
was proposing the death penalty for individuals who used guns to
kill? They scorned him. They laughed at Ronald Reagan. Where
were they when Ronald Reagan proposed... exclusionary rules
[so] that gun-carrying criminals could not walk out of court on a
technicality? They ridiculed President Reagan and his proposals
on the exclusionary rule. Where were they on the whole compre-
hensive crime package which was sure to focus on the gun-carry-
ing criminal in this country and to try to do something about
violence? Nowhere to be found. They laughed at Ronald
Reagan. 16 9
This speaker fallaciously (albeit somewhat ingeniously) shifted at-
tention from the damning effect of Mr. Reagan's blessing of the
Brady bill to the red herring of whether Brady bill supporters
agreed with the former President on earlier proposals.
This reasoning is defective because whether Brady supporters be-
lieve in the correctness of Ronald Reagan's opinions about other
issues is irrelevant to whether they believe he is right about the
Brady bill. Irrelevancy is the flaw in all red herring and straw man
arguments. 170 The irrelevancy stems from the dissimilarity between
the real point in issue and the distorted point in the case of a straw
man or the non-point in the case of a red herring. A person can
support the Brady bill but still oppose disarming the populace.
Likewise, a person can oppose the Brady bill but still be against con-
victed criminals purchasing handguns. To argue about an issue that
is unconnected to the real issue, whether by distorting the real issue
or by dredging up a non-issue, is to argue irrelevantly.
4. Faulty analogies
This is also the case with respect to faulty analogies, another di-
versionary fallacy that was prevalent in the Brady bill dispute. Anal-
ogies are a persuasive form of reasoning because consistent
treatment of similar situations strikes most people as not only logi-
cal, but fair. Children intuit this principle at an early age. Hence,
parents for all time have been forced to contend with the argument:
"Why can't I? Suzy's parents let her [go to the party, stay up late,
dye her hair purple, etc.]" If a person perceives two situations as
similar, the person expects them to be treated similarly.
169. 137 CONG. REc. H2824 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Gekas).
170. See FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 5, at 124-25 (explaining that red herring and
straw man arguments do not respond to real question).
1992]
92 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
To reason by analogy is to reason inductively, that is, to assume
that certain things are probably true because we know certain other
things to be true.' 7 ' In the law, analogical reasoning is the means
by which courts honor the doctrine of stare decisis. Judges make deci-
sions by searching for similar cases from which to extract a rule to
apply to the case under consideration. 172
For an analogy to be valid, the situations being analogized must
be truly similar. Moreover, they must be alike in ways that are im-
portant to the reason why the analogy is being drawn. 173 There may
be many similarities between two events, but if they are not relevant
to the heart of the dispute, any attempt to draw an analogy between
the two events would be fallacious. Two cases involving automobile
accidents may involve a host of amazing similarities such as the
color and model of the car, the day of the week on which the acci-
dent occurred, and that both drivers wore the unusual combination
of Chanel suits and Birkenstock sandals. However, these similarities
do not make the cases analogous for purposes of extracting a rule to
apply to both of them.
In the Brady bill debate, opponents of the legislation repeatedly
attempted to analogize waiting periods for handgun purchases with
waiting periods to purchase other commodities, such as a waiting
period to purchase an automobile, a baseball bat, or cocaine. With
regard to automobiles, Representative Smith argued:
Of course guns do kill but automobiles are the instrument in-
volved in killing many more times than guns are, and sometimes
they kill people within the first 7 days of ownership, but we don't
hear a proposal to delay the purchase of an automobile by 7 days
or that it would reduce the number of people killed by
automobiles. 174
Representative Schulze offered the analogy to purchasing baseball
bats: "Baseball bats killed 29 people in the city of Chicago in 1989.
Should we require a waiting period on baseball bats?"'7 Finally,
Representative Staggers asserted the analogy to purchasing cocaine:
"A 7-day waiting period is a simplistic answer. In the same logic, if
171. See generally CopI, supra note 5, at 348 (describing theories of analogy and inductive
reasoning).
172. See EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1949) (describing this
process of "reasoning by example" in classic book about legal reasoning). For a more recent
work explaining analogical reasoning in the law, see James R. Murray, The Role of Analogy in
Legal Reasoning, 29 UCLA L. REV. 833 (1982).
173. See Copi, supra note 5, at 358-60 (explaining necessity of relationship between sub-
jects of analogy).
174. 137 CONG. REC. H2840 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Smith).
175. Idl at H2862 (statement of Rep. Schulze) (noting also use of other inanimate objects
besides baseball bats, including knives and fireplace pokers, in commission of violent crimes).
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we would wait, say, 7 days to purchase cocaine, we could solve the
drug problem." 176
These analogies are ridiculously defective. The situations being
compared are very different, and the similarities that do exist are
irrelevant to the reasons supporting a waiting period for the
purchase of handguns. The only similarities between purchase
transactions for handguns and purchase transactions for auto-
mobiles, baseball bats, or cocaine are: first, the transactions involve
purchases, and second, the items purchased are capable of inflicting
death or serious bodily injury on human beings.
These similarities are irrelevant to the reasons underlying waiting
periods for handgun purchases. The primary purpose for imposing
a waiting period to buy a handgun is to give police an opportunity to
perform a background check to determine whether the purchaser is
a convicted felon or is otherwise prohibited from possessing a fire-
arm.1 77 Waiting periods to purchase automobiles and baseball bats
have no logical connection to this purpose because no laws prohibit
convicted felons from buying these items. With respect to cocaine,
it is illegal for any person to purchase the drug under any circum-
176. Id at H2856 (statement of Rep. Staggers).
177. H.R. 7, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(s)(1)(A) (1991); S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 2701(a)(u)(2) (1991). Some Brady bill proponents argued that the waiting period would
serve as a "cooling off" period in addition to allowing time for the performance of back-
ground checks. 137 CONG. REC. H2816 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Lloyd).
The rationale behind a cooling off period is that a person intent on buying a gun to kill some-
one might deliberate about the matter and change his or her mind if forced to wait several
days to obtain the gun. This justification for a waiting period was de-emphasized as the de-
bate progressed, however. In agreeing on a bill that would have phased out the federally
mandated waiting period once a computerized instant check system became operational,
House and Senate conferees implicitly rejected the notion that the waiting period would serve
double duty as a cooling off period. See supra note 3 (discussing legislative history and evolu-
tion of Brady bill).
Even if an interval for deliberation was one of the justifications for a waiting period, this
would not render the attempted analogies any more sound. Theoretically, it is true that peo-
ple buying baseball bats to use as murder weapons might change their minds if they were
required to wait a few days before obtaining the bats. But of course, the same could be said
about thousands of products capable of being used for mayhem: knives, rakes, frying pans,
rat poison, rope, and so on. Guns are unique in that they are the only product capable of
inflicting immediate death from a safe distance in a relatively clean and efficient manner.
Many people capable of pulling the trigger of a gun probably are not capable, for physical as
well as psychological reasons, of bludgeoning or garroting another human being to death. It
is not simply a coincidence that guns, particularly handguns, are the clear weapons of choice
for killing people. The Statistical Abstract of the United States shows that guns were the
cause of death in approximately 60% of all murders in the years 1980 and 1985-88. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 173
(1990). Handguns were responsible for 44% of all murders during those years. Id. Instru-
ments used to cut or stab came second to guns as the choice instrument for murder, being
used approximately 20% of the time. Id Blunt objects, including baseball bats and any other
instrument that could be used to bludgeon, placed third at roughly 5.5% of all murders in
1980 and 1985-88. Id
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stances, so discussion of a waiting period to buy cocaine makes little
sense.
The dissimilarities between these purchases make analogies be-
tween them inapposite. While all the products present a danger of
inflicting great harm, only handguns have that as their primary pur-
pose. The purpose of automobiles is to travel. The purpose of
baseball bats is to pursue the national pastime. The purpose of
handguns is to kill. Any kind of rational risk-utility analysis would
seem to support greater restrictions on handguns than on products
that have common everyday utility to large segments of society.
Brady bill foes made other strange analogies. Attempting to
demonstrate inconsistency on the part of "liberal" supporters of the
bill, anti-gun control partisans analogized waiting periods for hand-
gun transactions to waiting periods for free speech. 178 The argu-
ment was that if a person is willing to support a waiting period to
buy a gun, the person should also support waiting periods to speak
freely. For example, the person should support provisions obliging
newspaper editors to wait seven days before publishing the news.
The flaw, of course, is that there is no similarity between handgun
purchases and free speech, other than that both are the subject of
constitutional provisions. As stated above, the primary purpose for
imposing a waiting period for handgun purchases is to prevent ille-
gal sales to convicted felons. Obviously, no similar purpose would
be achieved by requiring a waiting period before a newspaper could
publish the news.
The most irresponsible analogy of the Brady bill debate came
from Oklahoma Representative Bill Brewster. In arguing against a
waiting period, Representative Brewster said, "To tax these individ-
uals with a 7-day waiting period is the same as telling criminals that
they have a 7-day hunting period on America's innocent fami-
lies." 179 Obviously, a seven-day waiting period to buy a gun is not
178. See 137 CONG. REC. H2819 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Walker). Rep-
resentative Walker stated:
I wonder what the reaction would be of those people if we, for instance, said you may
say anything you want in our society, but first of all there has to be a 7-day cooling off
period. Mr. Editor, you can write anything you want in your newspaper, but first of
all you have to apply to the Federal Government and tell them what you are going to
write about.
Id.; see also id. at H2856 (statement of Rep. Staggers). Representative Staggers stated:
The same logic is that if in fact we said to journalists, "Wait 7 days before you file
your stories," we would have no libel suits. Now I assume that if we could wait 7 days
... for our second amendment rights, the same logic would say we can wait 7 days
for our first amendment rights.
Id.
179. 137 CONG. REC. H2862 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Brewster) (empha-
sis added) (declaring Brady bill "an outrage and an assault on common sense").
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"the same" as an open hunting season on American families. This
assertion was so wild as to not warrant serious analysis.
While their analogies were not as bizarre as some of those offered
by Brady bill opponents, supporters of the legislation propounded
their own faulty analogies. Describing it as a "perfect analogy,"' 80 a
pro-Brady bill representative compared a waiting period to buy a
handgun to the noncontroversial requirement that visitors to the
United States Capitol pass through a metal detector to gain access
to the building.'18 This analogy, however, is far from perfect. First
of all, there is no constitutional right to enter the Capitol building,
whereas handgun waiting periods arguably have constitutional im-
plications.' 8 2 Moreover, a short delay waiting in line to pass
through a metal detector is not equal to the burden of a seven-day
waiting period to purchase a gun. Finally, there is a much more di-
rect means/end connection with respect to the Capitol metal detec-
tor than there is in the case of waiting periods to purchase
handguns. Metal detectors presumably are effective in preventing
persons from bringing most kinds of weapons into the Capitol,
whereas the extent to which waiting periods for handgun purchases
will keep criminals from obtaining guns is questionable.18 3
As seen in this discussion, analogies have dual persuasive poten-
tial. 18 4 Analogies can be employed to generate opposition to a pro-
posal by comparing the proposal to measures that most people
would find objectionable. This was the case when Brady bill foes
analogized handgun waiting periods to waiting periods to purchase
automobiles or to speak freely.' 85 Because most people would re-
180. Id. at H2838 (statement of Rep. Gilchrest).
181. Id.
182. See id. at H2838-39 (statement of Rep. Poshard) (arguing that Staggers bill requiring
immediate background checks is less restrictive of constitutional right to bear arms than
Brady bill's seven-day waiting period);J. Jennings Moss, Senate Votes 5-Day Wait for Handguns,
WASH. TIMES,July 1, 1991, at A5 (relating NRA lobbyist's argument that waiting period of any
kind to purchase handguns is unconstitutional).
183. See Robert J. Philhower, Automatic Sentences for All Gun Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
1990, at A28 (polling over 16,000 police chiefs and sheriffs and concluding that over 76% of
these law enforcement officers do not believe handgun waiting period will have effect on crim-
inal obtaining firearm); cf 137 CONG. REC. H2838 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Gilchrest) (supporting metal detectors at Capitol until better security system is available and
likewise supporting Brady bill as best currently available means to deter criminal gun
purchases).
184. See CORnE'r, supra note 4, at 115-20 (explaining that analogies are basically compari-
sons used to show either similarities or differences).
185. See also 137 CONG. REC. H2823 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Unsoeld)
(arguing that fundamental principle supporting constitutional rights such as free speech, free
exercise of religion, and women's right to choose abortion is that citizens need not wait for
governmental approval prior to exercising these rights); cf id. at H2843 (statement of Rep.
Carper) (analogizing seven-day waiting period to purchase handguns with inconvenience of
obtaining driver's license or registering to vote).
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ject waiting periods to buy cars or to speak as unreasonable, they
would also be likely to reject the Brady bill if they were convinced
the situations were similar. Analogies can also be used to engender
support for a proposal by comparing the proposal to existing meas-
ures that most people agree are sensible.186 In this way, the Brady
bill supporter mentioned earlier sought to persuade the audience
that handgun waiting periods are a good idea by comparing them to
the metal detectors at the Capitol, which most people probably be-
lieve to be a reasonable safety precaution. Because these analogies
did not involve truly similar situations, however, the comparisons
were fallacious diversions into irrelevancy.' 8 7 It is irrelevant that
waiting periods to buy automobiles are not wise because such delays
are not analogous to waiting periods to buy handguns. Similarly, it
does not matter whether metal detectors at the Capitol make sense,
because metal detectors have nothing in common with handgun
waiting periods.
C. Fallacies of Proof
The fallacies evaluated in this section involve problems of proof.
Proof in argumentation constitutes the premises from which conclu-
sions follow.' 8 8 Sound conclusions generally require convincing ev-
idence to sustain them.'8 9 Where evidence is ignored, distorted, or
otherwise manipulated, the argument is fallacious.' 90 The gun con-
trol controversy provides ample rhetoric to illustrate these fallacies.
1. One-sided assessment
It is fallacious to ignore countervailing evidence or arguments in
attempting to persuade. 19 1 Virtually any argument can be made to
sound convincing if relevant authority tending to disprove the argu-
ment is overlooked. Such one-sided assessments or half-truths 192
186. See CORBETr, supra note 4, at 115-20 (describing how comparison of similarities is
basic principle behind all inductive argumentation and analogy).
187. See generally CHASE, supra note 86, at 81-82 (discussing fallacy of false analogy).
188. See COHEN & NAGEL, supra note 29, at 7 (explaining that conclusions are implied by
premises of complete evidence or proof and that reasoning or inference from premises is
called deductive reasoning); IRVING M. CoPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 5-14
(1990) (providing analysis of arguments that consist of multiple propositions of which one,
called conclusion, is claimed to follow from others).
189. See FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 5, at 2 (observing that it is of little comfort to
know argument is entirely logical, that is, that conclusions are drawn from premises and rules
of syllogism are observed, if premises include fraud or delusion).
190. See DAMER, supra note 6, at 54-64 (explaining that fallacious arguments lacking in
proper evidentiary support include arguments that ignore, suppress, or minimize importance
of obvious evidence unfavorable to other side's position).
191. DAMER, supra note 6, at 60-62.
192. The one-sided assessment fallacy travels under a variety of names. See, e.g., DAMER,
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may not seem pernicious to attorneys or students of the law because
effective advocacy requires skill at emphasizing favorable evidence
and deemphasizing or distinguishing unfavorable evidence. For ex-
ample, if a defense lawyer in a capital case insisted during summa-
tion on giving an evenhanded, objective analysis of the testimony,
he or she would be rendering ineffective assistance of counsel.
93
Pursuit of the truth, some might say, is the lawyer's goal only if the
truth happens to coincide with the client's interests. What makes
such sleight of hand proper in this context is the adversarial nature
of the legal process. 194 If there is competent counsel on both sides,
the fact-finder ultimately will hear the important arguments and evi-
dence on both sides.' 9 5 However, the fact that one-sided assess-
ments are accepted as part of partisan advocacy does not make them
sound. 196 They remain fallacious and defective.
Outside of the legal process, half-truths become more insidious.
Where debate occurs in an arena not structured so as to ensure that
the arguments and evidence on both sides are fully and fairly
presented, a danger exists that opinions will be formed in an unen-
lightened way.' 9 7 This includes debate on most social and political
issues such as affirmative action, abortion, and gun control. It is
true that relevant facts and argument on both sides of prominent
issues will be disseminated, but in public debate, the dissemination
is likely to be fractured and unbalanced. In a trial, the fact-finder
cannot avoid hearing both sides because both the judge and jury sit
through the trial from beginning to end. Outside of the court room
supra note 6, at 60-61 (calling fallacy "Neglect of Relevant Evidence"); HAMBLIN, supra note 5,
at 25 (referring to fallacy as "special pleading or half truth"); SCHLAG & SKOVER, supra note 22,
at 19 (naming fallacy as "Competing Authority"); Jack L. Landau, Logic for Lawyers, 13 PAC.
LJ. 59, 93 (1981) (labeling one-sided assessment fallacy as fallacy of "Suppressed Evidence").
193. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1991) ("A lawyer should
act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy
upon the client's behalf."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry Canon 7 (1991)
(noting that lawyers should "represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law"); see
also HAMBLIN, supra note 5, at 25 (surmising that attorney could not build successful practice
without using fallacy of half-truth).
194. See DAMER, supra note 6, at 61 (noting that attorneys' adversarial role in judicial pro-
ceedings is exempt from truth-seeking process because it is jury and judge and not attorney
that must scrutinize and evaluate truthfulness of evidence in arriving at judgment).
195. See DAMER, supra note 6, at 61 (examining two situations, adversarial method ofjudi-
cial procedure and debating clubs, where slanting or neglecting evidence is culturally accepta-
ble because it is presumed that each side will attack or reveal irrelevancies and inconsistencies
on other side and that neutral party will decide issue being litigated or debated on basis of
evidence and arguments presented).
196. See DAMER, supra note 6, at 61 (arguing that winning debate or court case is not prin-
cipal concern of those interested in truth or rational decisionmaking).
197. See DAMER, supra note 6, at 61 (explaining that failure to evaluate counter-evidence to
one's own claim violates standard methodological principle of inquiry that one should investi-
gate all sides to issue and then accept position best supported by evidence).
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the discourse is less structured, and listeners are likely to receive
only bits and pieces of the relevant argument. Through uncon-
scious self-selection, listeners also are likely to hear only those parts
of the debate with which they already agree. 198 This fact makes bal-
ance a crucial element in public discourse.
Fundamental to any discussion of gun control is the proper inter-
pretation of the Second Amendment, which provides that "[a] well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed."' 199 The Amendment is subject to two very different inter-
pretations. One view is that the Amendment affords no individual
right to bear arms, but rather protects only a collective "state" right
to maintain an organized militia.200 Proponents of this "collective
right" position assert that the Second Amendment was promulgated
to allow states to protect themselves from the threat of the new na-
tional government's standing army by maintaining militias. They
find support for their interpretation in the linguistic structure of the
Amendment, arguing that the "well regulated Militia" preamble
serves to restrict the clause relating to the right to keep and bear
arms. Proponents of the competing view argue that the Second
Amendment guarantees and protects an individual right to keep and
bear arms. 20 Adherents to this "individual right" view rebut the
198. See ANTOINE ARNAUD, THE ART OF THINKING 266 (James Dickoff & Patricia James
trans., 1964) (1962) (discussing personal beliefs and self-interest as sources of believing
whether statement is true).
199. U.S. CONsT. amend. II.
200. For commentary espousing the collective view of the Second Amendment, see Law-
rence D. Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM.
HIsT. 22, 42 (1984) (commenting on long-held position that right was designed to maintain
collective militia, not grant specific individual right); Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan,
The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 5, 57 (1989) (arguing that Framer's intent behind Second Amendment was to assure
states that they would retain right to organized and effective militia, not to create broad indi-
vidual right); Peter B. Feller & Karl L. Gotting, The Second Amendment: A Second Look, 61 Nw. U.
L. REv. 46, 67-70 (1966) (asserting that Second Amendment refers to collective right of body
politic of every state to be protected by independent state militia); RalphJ. Rohner, The Right
to Bear Arms: A Phenomenon of Constitutional History, 16 CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 77-80 (1966) (advo-
cating approach to avoid debate over whether right to bear arms is individual or collective
one; namely, "the nature of the right to bear arms should be expressed in terms of the pur-
poses for which firearms can conceivably be used"); Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and
Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 961, 1000-
01 (1975) (explaining that adoption of Second Amendment "was result of political struggle to
restrict power of national government and to prevent disarmament of state militias," and
consequently, delegates at Constitutional Convention had no intention of establishing per-
sonal right to bear arms); John C. Santee, Note, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 26 DRAKE L.
REV. 423, 444 (1977) (accepting collective view of right to bear arms and concluding that
Second Amendment operates solely as restriction on Federal Government).
201. For commentary espousing the individual right view, see David 1. Caplan, Restoring
the Balance: The SecondAmendment Revisited, 5 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 31, 40 (1976-77) (arguing that
first Congress, in enacting Second Amendment, stated that well-regulated militia was "neces-
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linguistic argument by noting that in the 18th century, the "militia"
included all able-bodied citizens of the community and not simply
those who were members of state defense organizations equivalent
to the modem day National Guard.20 2
Both sides in this interpretive debate bolster their respective posi-
tions with extensive historical and ideological analysis. 203 In fact, it
has been observed that both sides often draw on the same historical
data to support their opposing views. 20 4 Each side asserts its posi-
tion with conviction and certitude. The problem is that there is little
basis in this debate for conviction or certitude. A review of the liter-
ature reveals strong arguments and evidence on each side. Yet, in
order to persuade readers to adopt their own strongly held beliefs,
the writers sometimes ignore opposing arguments and evidence. 20 5
This results in biased, one-sided analysis.
Illustrative of the one-sided analysis is the disagreement as to
whether the United States Supreme Court has adopted the collec-
tive right or the individual right interpretation of the right to bear
arms. The centerpiece of the Court's Second Amendment jurispru-
sary" to security of free state and not "sufficient" to security of free state, and that Congress
recognized that ordinary processes of law may be insufficient to protect people at all times);
Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the Predilection of Jdges Reign?, 36
OxLA. L. REv. 65, 100-01 (1983) (arguing that Framers' intent must be liberally construed and
that inherent in right to bear arms to secure well-regulated militia was right to self-defense);
Richard E. Gardiner, To Preserve Liberty-A Look at the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 10 N. Ky. L.
REV. 63, 95 (1982) (rejecting distorted interpretation of Second Amendment that deprives
individuals of right to bear arms and embracing original and plain meaning of right based on
historical premise); David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a jurisprudence of the
SecondAmendment, 9 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 561 (1986) (concluding that individual right
interpretation of right to bear arms is only approach that has any validity given historical
evidence, Framers' intent, and need to maintain consistent standard of constitutional inter-
pretation); Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,
82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 267-68 (1983) (arguing that Second Amendment language and philo-
sophical background support individual right interpretation for three purposes: (1) crime
prevention or self-defense; (2) national defense; and (3) preservation of individual liberty);
Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69J. AM. HisT. 599, 613-14
(1982) (stating that "the Second Amendment did not intend for Americans of the late eight-
eenth century to possess arms for their own personal defense").
202. E.g., Levinson, supra note 20, at 646-47 (arguing that term "militia" in 18th century
referred to all people or at minimum to those individuals treated as full citizens, and provid-
ing historical basis for conclusion).
203. Compare THE GUN CONTROL DEBATE, supra note 11, at 25-34 (using historical, polit-
ical, and social evidence to support strict gun control position) with THE GUN CONTROL DE-
BATE, supra note 11, at 93-107 (criticizing arguments in favor of strict gun control using
historical, statistical, and ideological factors).
204. See Robert E. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 125, 125 (1986) (arguing that because both sides of gun control debate use same his-
torical data to support their views, historical context in which Second Amendment originated
has been obscured).
205. See DAMER, supra note 6, at 54-55 (explaining how conclusions are often based on
ignorance); HAMBLIN, supra note 5, at 43-44 (discussing fallacy of argumentum ad ignorantium
that deals with purposeful refusal to examine opposing evidence).
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dence is its decision in United States v. Miller.20 6 The defendants in
Miller were charged with transporting an unregistered sawed-off
shotgun in interstate commerce in violation of the National Fire-
arms Act of 1934.207 The district court quashed the indictment,
agreeing with the defendants' demurrer that the Firearms Act of
1934 violated the Second Amendment. 208 On direct appeal, in an
opinion offering a little something for everyone, the Supreme Court
held that possession of the sawed-off shotgun was not protected by
the Second Amendment. 20 9
206. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
207. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939).
208. Id at 177.
209. Idt at 178. While the correct interpretation of Miller is not the concern of this discus-
sion, a brief summary of the opposing arguments in the interpretive debate may assist the
reader. The key passage in the opinion, from which both sides draw support, is the following
paragraph:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a 'shotgun
having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length' at this time has some reason-
able relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we can-
not say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an
instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of
the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common
defense.
Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. Supporters of gun control argue that by casting the issue in terms of
whether a sawed-off shotgun bears a reasonable relationship to the maintenance of the militia,
the Court endorsed the collective right interpretation of the Second Amendment. See May-
nard H.Jackson, Jr., Handgun Control: Constitutional and Critically Needed, 8 N.C. CENT. LJ. 189,
196 (1977) (pointing to Court's reasoning in prohibiting use of sawed-off shotgun because
weapon does not contribute to effectiveness of militia as support for collective right interpre-
tation); M. Truman Hunt, Note, The Individual Right to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Padfer,
1986 UTAH L. REV. 751, 757 (1986) (highlighting Court's emphasis on well-regulated militia
to support collective interpretation of Second Amendment). Opponents counter by quoting
the Court's observation that the militia is comprised of "all males physically capable of acting
in concert for the common defense." Miller, 307 U.S. at 179; see Robert Dowlut, Federal and
State Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59, 74 (1989) (noting Court's re-
fusal to take judicial notice that right to arms bears reasonable relationship to militia). This,
goes the argument, makes the Court's emphasis on the militia consistent with an individual
right interpretation of the amendment. Dowlut, supra, at 74.
Adherents of the individual right view suggest that the defendants in Miller, who did not
appear before the Supreme Court, Miller, 307 U.S. at 175, lost only because of a failure in
proof. See, e.g., Dowlut, supra, at 73-88 (opining that Miller opinion is defective in that Court
only considered plaintiff government's view); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Lib-
erty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 130 (1987) (emphasizing lack of
evidence, defendants' disappearance following trial court's dismissal, and defendants' failure
to brief their side of argument as justifications for defendants' loss); Weatherup, supra note
200, at 999 (suggesting that after failure of defendants to appear it was understandable that
Court in Miller viewed the issues as simple and not needing much analysis). Stressing the
Court's caveat in the above-quoted passage that in the absence of evidence the Court would
not take judicial notice that a sawed-off shotgun is a weapon that could be used by the militia
to contribute to the common defense, adherents of the individual right theory assert that
Miller can be read to guarantee protection for any weapon with proven military utility. See
Dowlut, supra, at 74 ("Miller leaves unanswered whether modem arms oF mass destruction
may be possessed by individuals."); Levinson, supra note 20, at 654-55 ("Ironically, Miller can
be read to support some of the most extreme anti-gun control arguments, e.g., that the indi-
vidual citizen has a right to keep and bear bazookas, rocket launchers and other armaments
that are clearly relevant to modem warfare, including, of course, assault weapons."); Jacob
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Critics and supporters of gun control both cite Miller as authority
for their respective views regarding the proper interpretation of the
Second Amendment.210 While some of this commentary is bal-
anced, much of it presents an unwarrantedly one-sided assessment
of the issue.211 This bias is reflected in the underwritten and over-
confident conclusions on the meaning of Miller offered by some
members of the collective right faction. One advocate of the collec-
tive right theory recently cited Miller for the assertion that the
Supreme Court has "ruled . . .that the Second Amendment has
nothing to do with individual rights to bear arms but rather the right
of the states to an armed militia."121 2 A reporter for the New York
Times echoed this sentiment when he stated that the Court has
"ruled at least three times that the Second Amendment has not the
slightest thing to do with an individual's right to bear arms. ' 213 The
writer described Miller as "the most trenchant of these deci-
sions."'214 And a scholar discussing Miller concluded that "[t]he sec-
ond amendment as interpreted within this context refers to a
collective right and not an individual right. 215 Another commenta-
tor, seizing on two sentences from the opinion in Miller, stated con-
fidently, "[t]hese words alone undercut any individual right
interpretation of the Second Amendment. 21 6 These conclusions
not only ignored relevant counterarguments derived from a fair
reading of the Miller opinion, but also failed to provide proper anal-
ysis to reach the particular conclusion.
Sullum, Devaluing the 2d Amendment, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 1991, at 23 (asserting that under Miller
test, weapons such as assault rifles and machine guns "are clearly covered by the 2d
amendment").
210. See supra note 209 (providing numerous views on proper interpretation of Second
Amendment following Miller).
211. See supra notes 191-200 (discussing fallacy of one-sided assessment or half-truth).
212. Amitai Etzioni, Gun ControL" A Vanilla Agenda, 1 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 6, 9 (1991).
Etzioni also quoted former Solicitor General and Dean of Harvard Law School Erwin Gris-
wold as stating, "Mhat the Second Amendment poses no barrier to strong gun laws is per-
haps the most well-settled proposition in American constitutional law." Id. Another pair of
commentators used almost the same words to assert this point. Ehrman & Henigan, supra
note 200, at 40 ("mhe proposition that the second amendment does not guarantee each
individual a right to keep and bear arms for private, non-militia purposes may be the most
firmly established proposition in American constitutional law.").
213. King, supra note 11, at 82.
214. Id.
215. Jackson, supra note 209, at 196.
216. Weatherup, supra note 200, at 999. The "words" in Miller that Weatherup referred
to are: "With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effective-
ness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It
must be interpreted and applied with that end in view." Id. at 999 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at
178). However, these words must be read in context with the Court's subsequent statement
that the "[M]ilitia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common
defense." Miller, 307 U.S. at 180. For a more complete discussion of the content of the Miller
opinion, see supra note 209.
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Supporters of the "individual right" theory have, for the most
part, presented a more in-depth analysis of Miller.2 17 This may be
due to the fact that a cursory reading of the case more readily sug-
gests a collective right interpretation, 218 and, therefore, opponents
of that view may feel they have more explaining to do. Neverthe-
less, while the analyses offered by those who advance the individual
right theory are generally more complete, their conclusions are just
as one-sided. For example, in stark contrast to the collective right
interpretations quoted above, a partisan of the individual right camp
offered this slant on the case: "[I]t is clear that Miller, even with its
limitations, supports the view that the second amendment guaran-
tees an individual right to keep and bear arms, including hand-
guns." 219 Another supporter of the individual right view offered
this equally one-sided assessment of the case: "[D]espite the short-
comings of the Miller opinion, the Supreme Court correctly con-
cluded that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to
keep and bear arms and thus rejected the untenable collective right
theory." 220
Obviously, these polar interpretations of Miller cannot both be
correct.221 It is doubtful that either is correct. The most accurate
assessment of Miller is that the opinion did not clearly indicate
whether the Second Amendment creates an individual right or only
a collective right.222 The correct interpretation of Miller is not really
the issue here. The issue is the process used to arrive at one inter-
pretation or the other. To present Miller as standing clearly for
either the collective right view or the individual right view is to com-
mit the fallacy of one-sided assessment, because such a presentation
depends on ignorance of strong competing evidence and
arguments. 223
217. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. (surveying individual right interpretations
of Second Amendment); infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text (same).
218. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (reasoning that if sawed-off
shotgun is not "part of the ordinary military equipment" nor contributes to common defense,
the Second Amendment does not guarantee right to bear such instrument); see also supra note
209 and accompanying text (discussing various interpretations of Miller).
219. Gardiner, supra note 201, at 92.
220. Lund, supra note 209, at 110.
221. But see Levinson, supra note 20, at 642 (dismissing any approach to Second Amend-
ment or Constitution that condemns opposing view as simply wrong due to "politics of inter-
pretation" that explain why one approach appeals to certain analysts at certain times while
other analysts favor different approach).
222. One possibility is that the Court in Miller endorsed what is known as the "hybrid"
interpretation of the Second Amendment, which holds that "individuals, not the organized
militia, are beneficiaries of a right to bear arms, but that the right is applicable only to militia
or military-related arms ...." Hardy, supra note 201, at 620.
223. A related kind of one-sided and incomplete assessment takes the form of relying on
anecdotal evidence to establish the truth of a proposition. Fischer calls this the fallacy of the
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2. Causal fallacies
Lawyers who remember their first-year torts class know that few
legal doctrines are as bereft of meaningful content as that of causa-
tion. Even ignoring the illusory principles of proximate or legal
cause and concentrating on the comparatively concrete concept of
causation in fact, "causality may have no more reality than a dragon
or a mermaid. ' 224 This is because the search for a causal nexus,
within or outside the law, requires that we apply a hypothetical alter-
native test in which we must compare what happened under a set of
known circumstances to what would have happened under a differ-
ent set of circumstances. The problem is the uncertainty involved in
ascertaining what would have happened under different circum-
stances. Such determinations are seldom subject to any kind of em-
pirical proof.2 25
As a result, we are often forced to draw inferences from nothing
more than the assumption post hoc, ergo propter hoc (after this, there-
fore because of this). In other words, we reason that because one
event followed another, the latter was caused by the former. Post hoc
reasoning is generally condemned as fallacious. 226 This is not al-
lonely fact. FISCHER, supra note 7, at 109. The fallacy is well-illustrated by Fischer's story
about a scientist who published an astonishing conclusion concerning the behavior of rats. Id
A doubting colleague came to visit the scientist and asked to review the data on which he
based his generalization. Id "Here they are," the scientist said as he handed over a sheaf of
materials. Il Then, pointing to a cage in the comer, he added, "there's the rat." Id
In the disagreement over the Brady bill, both sides tried to prove their positions with anec-
dotal evidence showing that waiting periods either would or would not be effective. In argu-
ing that the nation's "rogue's gallery of armed felons would be little deterred by any over-the-
counter gun control measure," then-Attorney General Richard Thornburgh described six hei-
nous crimes where the criminal involved obtained the gun by a means other than a retail
transaction. Richard Thornburgh, Six Real Guns..., WASH. POST, May 2, 1991, at A19. Other
opponents of the Brady bill pointed to the case of Bonnie Elmasri, a Wisconsin woman whose
battering husband killed her the day after she was prevented from obtaining a firearm because
of a two-day waiting period. 137 CONG. REc. H2862 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of
Rep. Schulze); id at H2859 (statement of Rep. Vucanovich). Waiting period advocates coun-
tered with their own anecdotes involving cases where convicted felons or mental patients
purchased weapons over the counter that subsequently were used to commit crimes. See id at
H2837 (statement of Rep. Roukema) (pointing to shooting of President Reagan's press secre-
tary James Brady and numerous other instances where background check may have prevented
injuries or deaths); 137 CONG. REC. S9827 (daily ed.July 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Byrd)
(describing scenarios where convicted felons and ex-convicts purchased guns without back-
ground checks and proceeded to kill their victims). No valid generalizations can be drawn
from such scant evidence, however. In a nation where millions of people own millions of
firearms and where more than 20,000 murders occur each year, the inventory of gun-related
tragedies is extensive enough to permit probably any conclusion to be drawn from isolated
cases.
224. W.P. MONTAGUE, THE WAYS OF KNOWING, OR THE METHODS OF PHILOSOPHY 199 (J.H.
Muirhead ed., 1928) (noting that causation may be merely product of human imagination).
225. See generally FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 5, at 17-21 (examining faulty causal
generalizations).
226. For a discussion of thepost hoc or false cause fallacy, see DAMER, supra note 6, at 68-69
(providing examples of post hoc fallacies and explaining that chronological relationship is only
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ways true, however. In many instances, our everyday experiences
allow us to draw reasonable inferences of causation from a sequence
of events. This is common in the law. Thus, where a person falls
while hurrying down a defendant's stairs, which were unlit and had
no handrail, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the defend-
ant's negligence caused the fall. 227
Post hoc reasoning is valid when applied to such simple, everyday
occurrences because a substantial body of community experience
exists by which to evaluate the events. While it is possible that the
person would have fallen even if the stairs had been properly lit and
a handrail provided, common experience tells us that traversing un-
lit stairs with no handrail greatly increases the likelihood that an ac-
cident will occur. Falling down unsafe stairs is a natural and
ordinary sequence of events.228 Post hoc reasoning in these circum-
stances is not fallacious.
The more complex the events, however, the more likely it is that
post hoc reasoning will be unsound.229 As the number of causal vari-
ables increases, the ability to draw reasonable inferences of causa-
tion based on a mere sequence of events decreases. A remark made
during the 1991 San Francisco mayoral race is illustrative. Com-
menting to a reporter about incumbent mayor Arthur Agnos' drop
in the polls the month before the election, an advisor to a compet-
ing candidate said, "[Agnos] spent $1 million to drop five points. If
he had spent $2 million, would he have dropped 10 points?" 230
This statement suggests that Mayor Agnos' drop in the polls was
caused by his spending $1 million on the campaign, when, in fact, it
is doubtful that any such correlation existed. Most likely, far more
complex factors than campaign spending were responsible for
Agnos' decline in support. To establish a causal relationship involv-
ing any complex sequence of events requires more in the way of
one factor in establishment of causal relationship); FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER,supra note 5, at 21-
22 (discussingpost hoc reasoning with examples and comments); FISCHER, supra note 7, at 166-
67 (explaining post hoc fallacies in historical scholarship); HAMBLIN, supra note 5, at 37-38 (re-
viewing philosophers' debate over false cause fallacy).
227. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694, 698 (La. 1885) (explain-
ing that where defendant's negligence greatly multiplies chance of plaintiff's accident and is
of character naturally leading to occurrence of accident, mere possibility that accident might
happen without plaintiff's negligence is insufficient to break chain of causation between negli-
gence and injury).
228. See idl at 698 ("Courts in such matters, consider the natural and ordinary course of
events, and do not indulge in fanciful suppositions.").
229. See FEARNSIDE & HoLrHER,supra note 5, at 21-22 (explaining difficulty of determining
causality due to complexity of causal variables).
230. Jerry Roberts, Mayor Race Gets More Bizarre-Debate Follows Twilight Zone, SAN FRAN.
CHRON., Oct. 26, 1991, at A8 (quoting EricJaye, advisor to mayoral candidate Angela Alioto).
Agnos lost to challenger Frank Jordan. Jennifer Warren & Richard Paddock, Jordan Defeats
Agnos in S.F. Mayor's Race, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1991, at A3.
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proof than simply showing that one event followed another.23 1
This same analysis holds true with respect to the reverse process
of reasoning that one event does not cause another event because
the latter does not invariably follow the former. Where events are
complex and many potential causal variables exist, a mere sequence
of events is not enough to disprove a causal relationship.
This flawed process of reasoning about causality infects one of the
primary arguments against gun control generally and the Brady bill
in particular. The argument is that gun control does not work be-
cause gun-related crime has risen in jurisdictions where gun control
laws have been adopted.23 2 Cast in the language of causation, the
argument is that gun control does not cause a reduction in gun
crime because such a reduction has not followed the enactment of
gun control. The fallacy of this argument is that it omits both
known and unknown variables that help explain this sequence of
events. It is an overly simplified assessment of the causal relation-
ship between guns and violent crime based on select information. 233
The fallacy is attributable to a failure to appreciate the distinction
between necessary and sufficient causes. A necessary condition of
an event is one that must be present for the event to occur but that
is not by itself sufficient to produce the event.2 4 A sufficient condi-
tion is one without which the event definitely will not occur.235 Gun
control is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one, to the re-
duction of gun-related violent crime in the United States. It is not a
231. See FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 5, at 21 (discussing fallacy of post hoc reasoning;
positing that valid causal relationship depends on many similarities between events said to be
related with no relevant instances of dissimilarity).
232. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S8938 (daily ed.June 28, 1991) (statement of Sen. Murkow-
ski) (noting that crime has not decreased in states with waiting periods and asserting that
"evidence overwhelmingly points to waiting periods having no effect on crime"); 137 CONG.
REc. H2860 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Williams) (suggesting that because
"[c]rime is rampant, and we now have 20,000 gun control laws and regulations on the books
in America," gun control does not work); id. at H2826 (statement of Rep. Volkmer) (citing
murder statistics from cities with gun control laws and concluding that "[g]un control laws
simply do not work"); id. at H2816-17 (statement of Rep. DeLay) (arguing that District of
Columbia's rising murder rate despite ban on handguns shows "there is no control in gun
control"); Paul Gallant, The Brady Bill Won't Stop Crime, NEWSDAY, Apr. 12, 1991, at 68 ("The
skyrocketing violent crime in New York City and Washington, D.C., attests to the failure of the
most stringent and oppressive gun laws in this country."); Gun Down the Brady Bill, supra note
149, at G2 (arguing that gun control does not work as evidenced by rising crime rate in five
states with waiting periods).
233. Cf 137 CONG. REC. H2842 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Valentine)
(stating that many arguments on gun control are more emotional than logical).
234. DAMER, supra note 6, at 65 (cautioning that people often confuse necessary condition
for sufficient one).
235. DAMER, supra note 6, at 65-66. Darner illustrates the difference between necessary
and sufficient conditions using a pianist as an example. He explains that the mere fact that the
musician has practiced piano for two hours a day-over a 15-year time period is not a sufficient
condition for the person to become a concert pianist, although surely it is a necessary one. Id.
1992]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
sufficient condition because the ready availability of guns is only one
of many causes that contribute to violent crime. A significant reduc-
tion in violent crime will occur only when other causes such as pov-
erty, drugs, and the disintegration of the family are dealt with
effectively and comprehensively. Nevertheless, while gun control
will not alone eradicate violent crime, violent crime probably will
not be eradicated without gun control.
The argument that rising crime in places where gun control has
been enacted shows that gun control does not work is also defective
for omitting known facts that are relevant to assessing the causal
nexus between gun control and violent crime. It is true, for exam-
ple, as the anti-gun control forces assert, that violent crime has in-
creased in New York City despite stringent rest'ictions on handgun
ownership. 23 6 What the argument fails to address, however, is that
as many as ninety percent of the handguns used to commit crimes in
New York City are transported there from states without stringent
gun control laws. 23 7 It is impossible to measure the potential suc-
cess of gun control under the patchwork of conflicting and inconsis-
tent state and local laws presently in existence. Only uniform,
national standards will enable us to determine whether restrictions
such as waiting periods work to reduce violent crime.
3. Arguments from ignorance
Because of the many complex variables involved, it is unlikely that
anyone will ever be able to prove that gun control laws either do or
do not work to diminish violent crime.238 Such proof simply does
not exist and probably never will. But the absence of this proof
236. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (arguing gun control is ineffective because
gun-related crime has increased in jurisdictions where gun control has been adopted). New
York has enacted many laws to combat handgun and other types of violence. See, e.g., N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 265.40 (McKinney 1992) (prohibiting residents of New York from purchasing,
otherwise obtaining, or transporting rifles or shotguns in contiguous state unless otherwise
eligible to possess same in New York). Additionally, in 1990, Mayor Dinkins announced a 60-
day amnesty in New York City for individuals who turn in illegal guns to police. See Laurie
Goodstein, Children Caught in 'Nightmare' of MY. Gunfire: Midsummer Crime Takes Its Toll of In-
nocents, WASH. PosT, Aug. 5, 1990, at A3.
237. 137 CONG. REc. H2846 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Panetta). In 1990,
the New York Police Department seized nearly 17,000 guns that originally were purchased
outside the state. Schumer, supra note 112, at 36. Similarly, only eight percent of the hand-
guns used in crime in Detroit were purchased in Michigan. 137 CONG. REC. H2846 (daily ed.
May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Panetta).
238. But see David Perlman, Medical Researchers Track Gun Control, Shooting Deaths, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 5, 1991, at A2 (discussing study conducted by members of Violence Research
Group at University of Maryland's Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology that com-
pared murder rate in District of Columbia to that in surrounding metropolitan areas of Vir-
ginia and Maryland and concluded that District of Columbia's tough gun laws continued to
have preventive effect on numbers of homicides that nonetheless increased due to drugs and
other factors).
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does not support a valid conclusion concerning either the efficacy or
non-efficacy of gun control.23 9 To argue that lack of evidence sup-
ports either position is to commit the fallacy of argumentum ad
ignorantiam, that is, an argument from ignorance. This fallacy occurs
whenever one argues that the absence of evidence in support of a
thesis establishes that the thesis is false, or conversely, that the ab-
sence of evidence in opposition to the thesis establishes that the the-
sis is true.240 In most cases, this assumption is flawed. For example,
one could not argue validly that ghosts do not exist because no one
has ever proven they do exist. 241 Nor could one validly conclude
that ghosts do exist simply because no one has ever been able to
prove they do not exist.242
Both opponents and proponents of gun control commit the fal-
lacy of argumentum ad ignorantiam when they argue that the absence of
proof concerning the efficacy of gun control supports their respec-
tive positions. Gun control opponents assert that the lack of proof
that gun control reduces violent crime supports the conclusion that
it does not.243 Gun control proponents advance essentially the op-
posite proposition, challenging the other side to prove that gun con-
trol does not reduce violent crime. 244
Both arguments constitute a specific type of argument from igno-
rance that historian David Fischer has labeled the fallacy of negative
proof. 245 Both sides are arguing, in effect, that "there is no evi-
dence of x; therefore, not-x." 246 This method of argumentation is
defective because the only acceptable means of showing not-x is by
producing affirmative evidence of not-x. 247 "No evidence" means
239. See DAMER, supra note 6, at 54-55 (explaining that using lack of evidence for one claim
as positive evidence for another is really no evidence at all and consequently conclusion is
based on ignorance).
240. See CopI, supra note 5, at 76 (arguing that no conclusion should be drawn concerning
truth or falsity of proposition due to absence ofproof); see generally DAmER, supra note 6, at 54-
55 (explaining fallacy of negative proof); HAMBLIN, supra note 5, at 43-44 (discussing argumen-
turn ad ignorantium fallacy).
241. See HAMBLIN, supra note 5, at 43-44 (discussing ghost hypothetical).
242. Copi, supra note 5, at 76. An exception exists in situations where a thorough investi-
gation would be likely to uncover proof regarding the matter but the investigation has been
undertaken unsuccessfully. Id at 77. Thus, it would not be fallacious to argue that a person
does not have a criminal record based on a thorough investigation of the person's background
that failed to disclose the existence of any criminal record.
243. E.g., 137 CONG. REC. S8938 (daily ed.June 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Murkowski)
(asserting "there is no evidence that a waiting period will help reduce crime").
244. See 137 CONG. REC. H2859 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Stenholm)
("What evidence do they [the NRA] have to support this claim and how do they know a na-
tionally implemented waiting period won't help fight crime?").
245. FISCHER, supra note 7, at 47 (defining fallacy of negative proof as attempt to sustain
factual proposition by negative evidence alone).
246. FISCHER, supra note 7, at 47.
247. See FISCHER, supra note 7, at 47 (explaining that historian may declare there is no
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only that one does not know whether a thing exists, which is much
different from knowing that it does not exist.248 When an issue is
not subject to empirical proof, one cannot reach a valid conclusion
regarding the issue based solely on the lack of such proof. 249 A
causal connection between gun control and a decrease in gun-re-
lated crime may never be shown, but this does not by itself warrant
the conclusion that gun control is unnecessary to crime control.
CONCLUSION
In the year that has passed since Congress debated the Brady bill,
an estimated four million new firearms entered the stream of com-
merce in the United States,250 bringing the total number of guns
possessed by American citizens to approximately 200 million.251 If
the country is concerned about altering its current gun policies, it
should act sooner rather than later. Each year that passes without
meaningful gun control reform will make it that much harder to im-
plement such reform. But as stated at the beginning of this Article
and demonstrated by the debate over the Brady bill, we cannot hope
to engage in meaningful law reform until we first reform the debate.
What is it about the issue of gun control that makes us unable or
unwilling to engage in rational discussion? Why do we choose falla-
cious reasoning over sound logical reasoning? Fallacies occur in ar-
gument for two basic reasons. First and most simply, fallacious
reasoning is an effective tool of persuasion.252 People engaged in
argument prefer winning over losing, so there is a natural inclina-
tion to resort to any effective means available to achieve that end.
Jeremy Bentham, for example, believed that most fallacies are em-
ployed intentionally, usually for bad purposes.253 Even a person in-
evidence of not-x but that only correct empirical procedure is to find affirmative evidence of
not-x, which is not possible).
248. FISCHER, supra note 7, at 48. Fischer illuminated this point by quoting the following
exchange between Alice and the King:
"I see nobody on the road," said Alice.
"I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked in a fretful tone. "To be able to
see Nobody! And at that distance tool"
FISCHER, supra note 7, at 48 (quoting THE COMPLETE WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL 223 (Modern
Lib. ed.)).
249. FISCHER, supra note 7, at 48 (discussing need for affirmative evidence because not
knowing whether something exists is different from knowing it does not exist).
250. See Alan Farnham, Inside the U.S. Gun Business, FoRTUNEJune 3, 1991, at 191 (stating
that in 1989, most recent year for which precise figures are available, American manufacturers
produced following numbers of firearms for nonmilitary use: 1,376,000 pistols, 622,000 re-
volvers, 1,382,000 rifles, and 688,000 shotguns).
251. Eckholm, supra note 57, at Al.
252. See Copi, supra note 5, at 5 (examining psychological persuasiveness of fallacies).
253. See BENTHAM, supra note 5, at 227-28 (listing common characteristics of all fallacies).
According to Bentham, the following characteristics pertain to all fallacies:
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dined to avoid fallacies may be tempted to use them when matched
against an opponent who does not feel similarly restrained, because
failure to do so might result in a competitive disadvantage. 254
However, although many fallacies are intentional rhetorical tricks
designed to gain a competitive edge, this does not fully explain why
rhetoricians use them. Fallacies also result from unconscious self-
deception.255 We often believe ideas or principles not so much be-
cause they have been proven to us, but because our passion, inter-
est, and self-love allow us to deceive ourselves. 256 In other words,
we believe what we want to believe; truth and utility become one
and the same. 257 This self-deception allows us to kill or at least sup-
press any doubts we might have in forming opinions about an issue.
The result is that the judgments we make and accept concerning the
issue are false. These false judgments, in turn, lead us to faulty
1. Whatever the measure in hand, they are irrelevant to it.
2. They are all of them such that their application affords a presumption either of
weakness or of the total lack of relevant arguments on the side on which they are
employed.
3. To any good purpose they are all of them unnecessary.
4. All of them are not only capable of being applied, but are actually in the habit
of being applied to bad purposes, that is-to the obstruction and defeat of all such
measures as have for their object the removal of abuses or other imperfections still
discernible in the frame and practice of the government.
5. By means of their irrelevancy they all consume and misapply time, thereby
obstructing the course and retarding the progress of all necessary and useful busi-
ness.
6. By the irritative quality which, in virtue of their irrelevancy and the improbity
and weakness of which it is indicative, they all possess (especially those that deal in
personalities), they are productive of ill-humor, even at times of bloodshed, and con-
tinually of waste of time and hindrance of business.
7. On the part of those who give utterance to them they are indicative either of
improbity or intellectual weakness, or of a contempt for the understandings of those
on whose minds they are destined to operate.
8. On the part of those on whom they operate, they are indicative of intellectual
weakness; and on the part of those in and by whom they are pretended to operate,
they are indicative of improbity in the shape of insincerity.
The practical conclusion is, that in proportion as the acceptance and hence the
utterance of these fallacies can be prevented, the understanding of the public will be
strengthened, the morals of the public will be purified, and the practice of govern-
ment will be improved.
Id.
254. See BENTHAM, supra note 5, at 240. Bentham suggested:
The opposers of a pernicious measure may sometimes be driven to employ fallacies
because of their supposed utility in answering counter-fallacies. Such is the nature of
men (they may say) that these arguments, weak and inconclusive as they are, never-
theless are those which make the strongest and most effectual impression upon the
bulk of the people (upon who ultimately everything depends).
Id. (challenging ability of individual to employ clear and sound reasoning because processes
ongoing in mind are so rapid as to leave no trace in one's memory).
255. Logicians have long emphasized this point. See, e.g., WHATELY, supra note 34, at 132.
256. See ARNAULD, supra note 198, at 266 (discussing faulty arguments advanced in public
life and everyday affairs).
257. See id- (explaining how individuals judge things not based on what they are in abstract
but rather on what things represent in relation to that individual).
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reasoning.258
The more an issue stimulates our passion or threatens our per-
sonal interests, the more likely it is that we will resort to faulty rea-
soning in debating the issue and the more likely it is that we will
accept faulty reasoning from others. This observation helps to ex-
plain why, although fallacies occur in much of political discourse,
they dominate the discussion of emotional issues. These issues in-
volve deeply ingrained beliefs; they are issues we are either "for or
against." When no common ground can be found regarding an is-
sue, there is no room for compromise. To acknowledge that there
are reasonable and meritorious arguments on the other side in such
a case is to discredit one's own beliefs. Abortion is an example of
such an issue. It presents a wholly irreconcilable conflict between
the right of the fetus to be born into the world and the right of the
mother to choose to terminate her pregnancy. To recognize the
right of the fetus to be born is necessarily to reject the right of the
mother to choose and vice versa. There simply is no middle ground
in this conflict.
With respect to gun control, the conflict is one between commu-
nity and individual rights. 259 Advocates of gun control view coer-
cive communitarian restrictions as the only commonsense answer to
escalating gun violence. 260 Gun enthusiasts view gun control as an
unwarranted encroachment on individual liberty.26' Ordinarily,
conflicts between community rights and individual rights do not in-
volve irreconcilable positions painted in black and white. Usually
there is some reasonable middle ground and hence some room for
using reasoned debate as a way to achieve a fair compromise. It is
possible to believe strongly in individual rights and yet recognize
that these rights must give way at some point for the protection of
the community, just as it is possible to recognize that the community
258. Ia at 264.
259. See generally EARL R. KRUSCHKE, THE RGrr TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 13-45 (1985)
(interpreting collective versus individual development of right to bear arms); see also supra
notes 200-01 and accompanying text (explaining collective versus individual viewpoints).
260. See supra note 112 (articulating Brady supporters' "common sense" views).
261. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S8939 (daily ed.June 28, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("If you believe in the second amendment and the right to keep and bear arms, which has
been time honored in this country, this is your chance to vote for it."); id. at S8936 (statement
of Sen. Craig) ("We are in fact saying to that average American citizen we are going to for just
a moment squeeze those rights that for over 200 years we have deemed as sacred."); 137
CONG. REC. H2852 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher) ("Let us not put
a bullet hole in the second amendment of the Constitution."); id at H2838 (statement of Rep.
DeLay) ("All the Brady Bill does is to take a little of that precious freedom away from our
fellow Americans."); Gun Down the Brady Bill, supra note 149, at G2 ("The truth is that the
Brady Bill will.., trample the rights of law-abiding Americans."); Nveske, supra note 94, at 9A
(printing letter to editors of USA Today stating that "[t]he Brady bill is a liberal political con-
spiracy and the first step in the total disarmament of the American populace").
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must endure some costs in order to protect individual liberties.
Courts forge this delicate balance every day in cases involving free
speech and procedural protections for suspects of crime.2 62
What sets gun control apart from other dialogues about the bal-
ance between community responsibility and individual rights is that
gun owners truly believe that any restriction on gun ownership will
be only the first step toward gun confiscation.263 While this fear is
unjustified as a matter of political reality, it has some basis in the fact
that banning guns (or at least handguns) is the true agenda of many
gun control proponents. 264 Accordingly, it is difficult if not impossi-
ble to decouple arguments concerning the reasonableness of any
particular gun control measure from the much larger argument re-
garding whether society should ban guns altogether. As to the lat-
ter issue, the positions are firmly fixed miles apart.
But we need not view the issue of gun control so rigidly. We
could find common ground in the debate if both sides would temper
their positions. Gun control proponents who are serious about ac-
complishing anything should abandon their rhetoric calling for a
complete ban on gun ownership. Not only will a complete ban
never happen, it is questionable whether we should even want it to
happen. With 200 million guns already in circulation, it is likely that
a legal ban on guns would prevent only law-abiding citizens from
possessing them. Unless and until a way is developed to take all the
guns out of the hands of criminals, even staunch anti-gun propo-
nents should be uneasy about the prospect of banning legal owner-
ship of guns.
Opponents of gun control, on the other hand, need to relinquish
262. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542-43 (1992) (discussing bal-
ancing of free speech issues against other concerns in First Amendment analysis); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349-52 (1967) (discussing opposing concerns of privacy and state
interests and revealing that almost all governmental action interferes with personal privacy to
some extent). One curious paradox of gun control is that it reverses the traditional roles in
the community responsibility/individual rights debate. Gun control is the liberals' responsi-
bility issue and the conservatives' rights issue. No other issue casts liberals as strong propo-
nents of communitarian restrictions and conservatives as staunch defenders of individual
rights. Only in the topsy-turvy world of Second Amendment discourse would one find the
American Civil Liberties Union advancing a restrictive interpretation of a constitutional lib-
erty that recognizes no protecton for individuals, ACLU Policy Statement No. 47, cited in Lev-
inson, supra note 20, at 644 n.40, and a conservative United States Senator characterizing the
same liberty as the "right most valued by free men." The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. viii (1982) (preface by Sen.
Hatch).
263. See supra notes 141-62 and accompanying text (exploring slippery slope belief of gun
control opponents that any restriction would be first step in eliminating right guaranteed by
Second Amendment).
264. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text (discussing ban on handguns as one
ultimate goal of gun control advocates).
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their unnecessarily alarming slippery slope arguments and be more
willing to consider reasonable measures to keep guns out of
criminals' hands. The public interest demands that gun control op-
ponents be more amenable to making reasonable concessions con-
cerning their private interests. 265 The gun control measures that
have managed to receive serious consideration thus far have been
very modest. Certainly, the Brady bill seems to fall into this cate-
gory. Gun owners should evaluate gun control proposals on their
true merits, rather than on the spectre of what might come next.
We impose restrictions on other individual rights for the benefit of
the community and have been successful in avoiding free falls down
the slippery slope. There is no reason to believe we could not be
just as successful with respect to regulating guns.
The lesson to be learned from studying the rhetoric used in the
debate over the Brady bill is important. Jeremy Bentham believed
that fallacies are used almost exclusively to perpetuate wicked-
ness. 266 Bentham's assessment is perhaps too harsh given that falla-
cies often result from unwitting self-deception. But even if fallacies
are used only to perpetuate blindness and ignorance, that is bad
enough.
It does not require much argument to support the proposition
that we should make important social policy decisions in a climate of
reason rather than in the fog of fallacy. We certainly try to abide by
this principle in our personal lives. For example, suppose a person
is faced with the decision whether to move out of an apartment and
buy a particular house. The prospective homeowner hears the fol-
lowing arguments from friends and real estate agents: (1) "I have a
friend who decided not to buy a house and she got struck by light-
ning the next day"; 26 7 (2) "Everybody who is anybody owns their
265. Gun owners have the most to lose in the gun control debate. People who want to
impose gun control are, for the most part, people who do not own guns and have no desire to
own guns. They may champion the community's interest without any risk of loss to them-
selves. This is not true of gun owners, who must give something up in order to promote the
community's interest.
It has already been noted that self-interest clouds our ability to reason without the intrusion
of fallacies. See supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text (discussing self-deception involved
in fallacious reasoning). Jeremy Bentham asserted that when private interests collide with the
public interest, private interests always take precedence. He went so far as to argue that
"[taking the whole of life together, there never has existed nor can there ever exist a human
being in whose instance any public interest he can have had, will not, insofar as it depends
upon himself, have been sacrificed to his own personal interest," and accepted the supposi-
tion that "on the part of every individual whose conduct is thus to be shaped and regulated,
the cause which will determine his conduct will be interest, his own private interest." BEN-
THAM, supra note 5, at 230.
266. See supra note 253 (outlining characteristics thought by Bentham to be common to all
fallacies).
267. See supra notes 224-30 and accompanying text (discussing causal fallacy ofpost hoc ergo
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own house"; 26 8 and (3) "If you don't buy that house, you won't own
your own place." 269 These arguments are absurdly defective and it
is unlikely a person would be influenced by them in deciding
whether to buy a house. Yet in the debate over the Brady bill in-
volving a major national policy decision, we accepted arguments as
absurd as these. To echo Jeremy Bentham's optimism concerning
the destiny of political fallacies in Parliament, we can only hope that
the next time a gun control measure comes before the people of the
United States, the first person to utter a fallacy will be greeted not
with approval, "but with voices in scores crying aloud 'Stale! Stale!
Fallacy of Authority! Fallacy of Distrust' and so on." 270
propter hoc). Post hoc reasoning consists of assuming that because one event followed an earlier
event, the second occurrence was caused by the earlier event. FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra
note 5, at 21. It is doubtful that there is any causal relation between the demise of the
speaker's friend and her decision not to buy a house.
268. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (discussing fallacy of argumentum ad
populum). This appeal involves an implicit argument that a course of action is wise because it
is accepted by a large number of people. See also CopI, supra note 5, at 79-80 (discussing
"bandwagon" approach that establishes particular propositions as true because "everyone"
accepts idea). The fallacy commonly appears in advertising campaigns of the type touting that
"Two million satisfied customers can't be wrong." This fallacy also involves an element of
snob appeal. See id. (explaining that snob appeal argument attempts to associate acceptance
of conclusion with other desirable things). The fact that everyone else owns a house is logi-
cally irrelevant to whether our potential house buyer should purchase one.
269. This is a fairly blatant example of begging the question. Begging the question con-
sists of assuming as an argument's premise the very conclusion that is sought to be proved.
Copi, supra note 5, at 83 (explaining that argument that begs question is fallacious in sense
that incorrect procedure is employed for establishing truth of conclusion). The argument in
the text asserts in effect that the person should buy the house because, otherwise, he or she
will not own a house. In other words, it accepts as a premise that the person should buy the
house to prove the conclusion that the person should buy the house.
270. BENTHAM, supra note 5, at 259.

